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Strong Secrecy from Channel Resolvability
Matthieu R. Bloch, Member, IEEE, and J. Nicholas Laneman, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—We analyze physical-layer security based on the
premise that the coding mechanism for secrecy over noisy
channels is tied to the notion of channel resolvability. Instead
of considering capacity-based constructions, which associate to
each message a sub-code that operates just below the capacity
of the eavesdropper’s channel, we consider channel-resolvability-
based constructions, which associate to each message a sub-code
that operates just above the resolvability of the eavesdropper’s
channel. Building upon the work of Csisza´r and Hayashi, we
provide further evidence that channel resolvability is a powerful
and versatile coding mechanism for secrecy by developing results
that hold for strong secrecy metrics and arbitrary channels.
Specifically, we show that at least for symmetric wiretap
channels, random capacity-based constructions fail to achieve
the strong secrecy capacity while channel-resolvability-based
constructions achieve it. We then leverage channel resolvability
to establish the secrecy-capacity region of arbitrary broadcast
channels with confidential messages and a cost constraint for
strong secrecy metrics. Finally, we specialize our results to study
the secrecy capacity of wireless channels with perfect channel
state information, mixed channels and compound channels with
receiver Channel State Information (CSI), as well as the secret-
key capacity of source models for secret-key agreement. By tying
secrecy to channel resolvability, we obtain achievable rates for
strong secrecy metrics with simple proofs.
Index Terms—information-theoretic security, wiretap channel,
secret-key agreement, information-spectrum, channel resolvabil-
ity, wireless channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
In virtually every communication system, the problems of
reliability and secrecy are handled in fundamentally different
ways. Typically, error-correcting schemes in the physical-
layer guarantee reliable communications, while encryption
algorithms and key-exchange protocols in the upper layers1
ensure data secrecy. Physical-layer security puts forward an
alternative role for the physical layer, whereby reliability and
secrecy can be handled jointly by means of appropriate coding
schemes. The idea is to recognize the presence of noise in
every communication channel, including the channel of a po-
tential adversary who eavesdrops on transmitted signals, and to
exploit knowledge of noise statistics to prevent eavesdroppers
from retrieving information. Unlike most existing security
schemes, physical-layer security can guarantee information-
theoretic security, by which secrecy is measured quantitatively
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1Specific cryptographic schemes are implemented at all upper layers of the
protocol stack, including MAC, transport, network, and application layers.
in terms of the statistical dependence between the messages
transmitted and the observations of eavesdroppers.
The theoretical foundation of physical-layer security is the
early works of Wyner [1] and Csisza´r & Ko¨rner [2], which
prove the existence of coding schemes ensuring reliability
and secrecy for the wiretap channel; however, the recent
surge of information-theoretic results regarding the wiretap
channel has fostered few practical engineering solutions. This
state of affairs is partly due to the fact that most works
extend the coding schemes of [1], [2], in which the coding
mechanism that guarantees secrecy is tied to channel capacity.
This mechanism will be precisely defined in Section III; at this
point, suffice to say that the codes in [1], [2] are a union of
sub-codes that operate just below the capacity of the eaves-
dropper’s channel as the blocklength grows large. Although
such coding schemes have been successfully used to study
many multiuser information-theoretic secrecy problems [3],
[4], deriving secrecy from channel capacity leaves open a few
lingering issues:
1) wiretap channel models that incorporate the limitations
of modern communication systems, such as the presence
of memory, are difficult to analyze;
2) the results obtained by tying secrecy to channel capacity
are deemed too weak for cryptographic applications.
This paper builds upon an original observation of Csisza´r [5]
and the work of Hayashi [6] to explore an alternative approach
to physical-layer security that addresses the aforementioned
issues; the premise of the approach is to relate the coding
mechanism for secrecy to the notion of channel resolvabil-
ity [7], [8] and not to channel capacity.
A. Motivating Examples
To motivate the usefulness of channel resolvability, we start
with two intuitive examples that shed light on the mechanisms
one could exploit to ensure information-theoretic security.
Example 1 (One-time pad). Consider a binary message
W ∈ {0, 1} that is encoded into a codeword Z as Z = W⊕K ,
where K ∼ B ( 12) is a secret key and ⊕ denotes modulo-
two addition. The crypto lemma [9] shows that the output
distributions pZ|W=0 and pZ|W=1 are identical and equal to
the uniform distribution on {0, 1}; hence, messages are statis-
tically indistinguishable for an eavesdropper only observing
Z . From an operational perspective, note that the encoder
exploits the key K to ensure that all messages induce the same
output distribution.
Example 2 (Transmission over a noisy Gaussian channel).
Consider an uncoded message W uniformly distributed in
the set {−1,+1} and observed by an eavesdropper at the
output of a real additive white Gaussian noise channel as
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Z = W + N , where N ∼ N (0, σ2). As illustrated in
Figure 1, the output distributions pZ|W=−1 and pZ|W=+1
become indistinguishable from the average distribution pZ as
the noise variance increases. Specifically, as σ goes to infinity,
pZ|W=−1
−1 +1
pZ|W=+1
pZ
Fig. 1. Distributions of channel outputs for uncoded transmission of {−1,+1}
over an AWGN channel.
one can show that, for each m ∈ {−1,+1}, the variational
distance between pZ|W=m and pZ is at most O(σ− 12 ). In other
words, if the noise introduces enough randomness, then the
channel itself ensures that all messages approximately induce
the same output distribution.
In each example, statistical indistinguishability is obtained
because there exists a source of randomness (key or channel
noise) and a coding mechanism by which all messages induce
the same distribution for the eavesdropper’s observations; this
mechanism is reminiscent of the codes analyzed in [7], [8],
[10] to study the notion of channel resolvability. At this point,
the connection between secrecy and channel resolvability may
seem contrived but, nevertheless, it suggests the possibility of
ensuring secrecy by means that are different from those based
on channel capacity and used in [1], [2]; this was already
observed in [5] and more formally explored in [6]. In the
remainder of this paper, we further expand upon this idea
and we not only highlight the benefits of explicitly connecting
secrecy to channel resolvability but also show the limitations
of an approach based on channel capacity.
B. Related Work
Most communication architectures providing information-
theoretic security are based on two models of communication.
The wiretap channel, introduced by Wyner [1] and generalized
by Csisza´r & Ko¨rner [2], models an architecture in which
a transmitter encodes messages W into codewords X of n
symbols for transmission to a receiver, in the presence of an
eavesdropper that obtains noisy observations Z of X. In the
case of discrete memoryless channels, [1], [2] have shown
the existence of coding schemes simultaneously ensuring
reliable transmission to the receiver and secrecy with respect
to the eavesdropper. In particular, it is possible to characterize
the secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel, defined as the
supremum of all reliable and secure rates. The extension of
this result to Gaussian [11] and wireless channels (see, for
instance, [12] and references therein) suggests the potential
of such coding schemes to secure communication networks
at the physical layer. An alternative to the wiretap channel
is the source model for secret-key agreement introduced by
Maurer [13] and Ahlswede & Csisza´r [14], which considers an
architecture in which two legitimate parties attempt to distill
secret keys from a noisy source by communicating over a
public channel. The resulting keys have to be secure with
respect to an eavesdropper who obtains correlated observations
from the source and observes all messages exchanged over
the public channel. This architecture differs from the wiretap
channel by exclusively focusing on the rate of the secret key
that can be distilled from the source and by ignoring the cost of
public communication. The counterpart of secrecy capacity is
the secret-key capacity, defined as the supremum of the secret
key rates that can be distilled. Although the aforementioned
architectures model fundamentally different communication
scenarios, they are related in that a coding scheme for the
wiretap channel can be used to design a coding scheme for
secret-key agreement and vice-versa.
The early information-theoretic security results obtained for
the wiretap channel and source model for secret-key agreement
are criticized in some circles for measuring statistical depen-
dence in terms of the average information rate leaked to the
eavesdropper 1
n
I(W ;Z). The weakness of this metric from
a cryptographic standpoint has been highlighted in multiple
works [4], [15], [16], which have instead advocated using the
average information leaked I(W ;Z). The analysis of secure
communication architectures under this more stringent secrecy
metric has been performed with different methods, such as
graph-coloring techniques [5], privacy amplification [16], [17],
and channel resolvability [6], [18]. The results presented in
this paper further clarify the relation between secrecy and
channel resolvability and highlight the potential of channel
resolvability for solving secure communication problems.
The connection between secrecy and channel resolvabil-
ity is better illustrated by studying secure communication
architectures beyond the traditional memoryless setting; in
particular, the distinction between the coding mechanisms for
reliability and secrecy becomes apparent in the expressions
of the results themselves. In this context, the information-
spectrum methods pioneered by Han and Verdu´ turn out to
be convenient mathematical tools, as they allow us to analyze
general channels by focusing on the properties of mutual
information as a random variable. We note that these tools
have already been used to study some information-theoretic
security problems and our results provide extensions of [6],
[19]–[21].
C. Summary of Results
In this section, we highlight the results presented in this
paper, preliminary versions of which have been reported
in [22], [23].
• We clarify the relation between information-theoretic se-
curity and statistical independence by investigating alter-
natives to the average mutual information rate 1
n
I(W ;Z),
which is used as the de facto metric in most earlier
works. The average mutual information rate is actually
a normalized Kullback-Leibler divergence between the
joint distribution pWZ and the product distribution pW pZ;
the closeness of these two distributions can be measured
by other means, such as the variational distance or even
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random
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variable I(W ;Z). By establishing relations among differ-
ent metrics (Proposition 1) we highlight the importance
of choosing a measure of statistical dependence that is
not only simple enough to be analytically tractable but
also strong enough to be cryptographically relevant. This
discussion also provides the basis for elegant converse
proofs.
• We provide evidence that channel resolvability is a con-
venient mechanism for secure communication by formal-
izing the ideas introduced in Example 1 and Example 2.
Specifically, we connect secrecy to channel resolvability
to analyze the fundamental limits of Shannon’s cipher
system (Theorem 1) and of the broadcast channel with
confidential messages (Theorem 2). In the latter case, we
show that at least for some specific wiretap channels,
deriving secrecy from channel resolvability is more pow-
erful than deriving secrecy from channel capacity (Propo-
sition 2); we also derive the secrecy-capacity region for
general broadcast channels with a cost constraint and for
strong secrecy metrics (Theorem 2 and Theorem 3);
• We further leverage the connection between secrecy and
channel resolvability to revisit various models of secure
communication. We first provide a simple proof of the
strong secrecy capacity of ergodic-fading wireless chan-
nels with full channel state information (Proposition 3).
We then show that known achievable rates for mixed
channels and compound channels with receiver CSI can
be obtained with conceptually simple proofs, and that
these results hold under stronger secrecy metrics than was
previously established (Proposition 4 and Proposition 5).
• We finally exploit the general characterization of secrecy
capacity to bound the secret-key capacity of a general
discrete source model for secret-key agreement (Proposi-
tion 7). The form of the result, which involves conditional
entropy instead of mutual information, suggests that the
mechanism behind secret-key agreement is not channel
resolvability but rather channel intrinsic randomness [5],
[24].
D. Outline
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II sets the notation used throughout the paper. Section III
introduces and compares several secrecy metrics that can be
used to measure information-theoretic security. Section IV
analyses the fundamental limits of secure communication for
Shannon’s cipher system. Section V, which forms the core
of the paper, proves the impossibility of achieving strong
secrecy capacity with random codes deriving secrecy from
channel capacity for some wiretap channels and establishes
the secrecy-capacity region of general broadcast channels with
confidential messages. Section VI presents applications of
the general results to wireless channels, mixed channels and
compound channels, and secret-key agreement, which may be
of independent interest. Section VII offers some concluding
remarks. The technical details of the proofs are organized
into a series of lemmas, whose proofs are relegated to the
appendices to streamline the presentation.
II. NOTATION
To fix notation for the sequel, consider three random vari-
ables X , Y , and Z with sample values x, y, and z taking
values in alphabets X , Y , and Z , respectively. The joint
probability distribution is denoted pXY Z , and the marginal
probability distributions are denoted by pX , pY , and pZ .
Unless mentioned otherwise, alphabets are assumed to be
abstract alphabets, including countably infinite or continuous
alphabets. If the alphabets are finite, then the probability
distributions correspond to probability mass functions; if the
alphabets are uncountable, then the probability distributions
correspond to probability densities, which we assume exist.2
The mutual information between X and Y is the random
variable3
I(X ;Y ) , log
pXY (X,Y )
pX(X) pY (Y )
.
The average of this random variable is the usual average
mutual information, which we denote by I(X ;Y ). For discrete
random variables, I(X ;Y ) has the familiar expression
I(X ;Y ) , EXY [I(X ;Y )]
=
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
pXY (x, y) log
pXY (x, y)
pX(x) pY (y)
.
The conditional mutual information between X and Y given
Z and the average conditional mutual information are accord-
ingly defined as
I(X ;Y |Z) , log pXY |Z(X,Y |Z)
pX|Z(X |Z) pY |Z(Y |Z)
and I(X ;Y |Z) , EXY Z [I(X ;Y |Z)],
respectively. Similarly, the entropy and average entropy of X
are
H(X) , log
1
pX(X)
and H(X) , EX [H(X)],
and the conditional entropy and average conditional entropy
of X given Y are
H(X |Y ) , log 1
pX|Y (X |Y )
and H(X |Y ) , EXY [H(X |Y )].
All the usual relations between average mutual information
and average entropy that result from basic properties of joint,
marginal, or conditional probability distributions can be shown
to hold with probability one for the mutual information and
entropy random variables. In particular, the chain rules of
mutual information and entropy hold with probability one.
The average mutual information I(X ;X ′) between two
random variables X ∈ X and X ′ ∈ X is a Kullback-Leibler
divergence, which measures the closeness of the distributions
pXpX′ and pXX′ . We will often use an alternative measure
2We note that more general situations can be treated with the approach of
Pinsker [25].
3Unless indicated otherwise, logarithms and exponentials in the paper are
taken to base two.
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in terms of the variational distance between the distributions,
defined as4
V(pX , pX′) , 2 sup
A⊆X
|PX [A]− PX′ [A]| .
The variational distance is not as convenient to manipulate as
the average mutual information, but we provide simple rules
for variational distance calculus in Appendix A.
Given two real numbers a, b we define Ja, bK as the set of
integers {n ∈ N : ⌊a⌋ 6 n 6 ⌈b⌉}. To simplify notation,
all vectors of length n are denoted by boldface letters; for
instance, x denotes the vector of sample values (x1, . . . , xn)
while X denotes the random vector (X1, . . . , Xn). Given two
random vectors X and Y, characterized by a joint probability
distribution pXY, the probability distribution of 1nI(X;Y)
is referred to as the mutual information rate spectrum. In
addition, the spectral-inf mutual information rate is defined
as [10]
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Y) ,
sup
{
β : lim
n→∞
P
[
1
n
I(X;Y) < β
]
= 0
}
,
and the spectral-sup mutual information rate is defined as
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Y) ,
inf
{
α : lim
n→∞
P
[
1
n
I(X;Y) > α
]
= 0
}
.
Operationally, the spectral-inf mutual information rate relates
to channel capacity [26] whereas the spectral-sup mutual infor-
mation rate relates to the channel resolvability [7]. Similarly,
given an arbitrary sequenceX, the entropy rate spectrum is the
distribution of the random variable 1
n
H(X), and the spectral-
inf entropy rate is defined as
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(X) , sup
{
β : lim
n→∞
P
[
1
n
H(X) < β
]
= 0
}
,
while the spectral-sup entropy rate is
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
H(X) , inf
{
α : lim
n→∞
P
[
1
n
H(X) > α
]
= 0
}
.
The spectral-sup and spectral-inf mutual information and
entropy rates play a fundamental role in the analysis of reliable
communication and randomness generation [7], [26], [27].
They also play a role in the analysis of secure communications,
and our results combine these quantities in various ways.
III. PRELIMINARIES: SECRECY METRICS
Let n ∈ N∗ and R > 0. Let W ∈ J1, 2nRK be a
random variable that represents a message in a communication
scheme. Assume that an eavesdropper has some knowledge
about W represented by another random variable Z ∈ Zn,
characterized by the joint probability distribution pWZ. As
mentioned in the introduction, message W is information-
theoretically secure if it is statistically independent of Z;
4This general definition of variational distance reduces to∑
x∈X
|pX(x)− pX′(x)| if X is countable.
however, exact statistical independence between W and Z
is extremely stringent and, for tractability, it is convenient
to use a slightly weaker measure of secrecy, by which we
only require W and Z to be asymptotically independent as
the parameter n tends to infinity. Note that there is some
leeway in the definition of asymptotic independence because
one can choose how to measure the dependence between W
and Z. For instance, given any distance d for the space of
joint probability distributions on J1, 2nRK × Zn, the quantity
d(pWZ; pW pZ) could be used as a metric, and asymptotic
statistical independence then amounts to the condition
lim
n→∞ d(pWZ; pW pZ) = 0.
In the following, we specify six reasonable choices for secrecy
metrics. The first metric measures statistical dependence using
the Kullback-Leibler divergence:
S1 (pWZ, pW pZ) , D(pWZ‖pW pZ) = I(W ;Z).
The secrecy condition limn→∞ S1 (pWZ, pW pZ) = 0 corre-
sponds to the well-known strong secrecy [15]. A second metric
that we will find particularly useful is based on the variational
distance:
S2 (pWZ, pW pZ) , V(pWZ, pW pZ).
For any ǫ > 0, the asymptotic independence of W and Z can
also be measured in terms of the CDF of I(W ;Z):
S3 (pWZ, pW pZ) , P[I(W ;Z) > ǫ],
in which case the secrecy condition
∀ǫ > 0 lim
n→∞ S3 (pWZ, pW pZ) = 0
means that the random variable I(W ;Z) converges in proba-
bility to zero. Finally, one could also weaken the metrics above
by introducing a normalization by a factor of n as
S4 (pWZ, pW pZ) ,
1
n
D(pWZ‖pW pZ)
S5 (pWZ, pW pZ) ,
1
n
V(pWZ, pW pZ),
for ǫ > 0 S6 (pWZ, pW pZ) , P
[
1
n
I(W ;Z) > ǫ
]
.
The secrecy condition limn→∞ S4 (pWZ, pW pZ) = 0 corre-
sponds to the weak secrecy initially introduced by Wyner [1].
The secrecy conditions5 limn→∞ Si(pWZ, pW pZ) = 0 may
not be equivalent for all i ∈ J1, 6K; by establishing an ordering
among these metrics, we formalize what it means for a metric
to be “stronger” than another. For i, j ∈ J1, 6K, we say that
Si is stronger than Sj (or equivalently that Sj is weaker than
Si), and we write Si  Sj if and only if
lim
n→∞
Si(pWZ, pW pZ) = 0⇒ lim
n→∞
Sj(pWZ, pW pZ) = 0.
By construction, it is clear that S1  S4, S2  S5 and S3  S6;
however, we establish a more precise result.
Proposition 1. The secrecy metrics Si for i ∈ J1, 6K are
ordered as follows.
S1  S2  S3  S4  S5  S6.
5The limit should be understood for any ǫ > 0 in the case of metrics S3
and S6.
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Proof: The relations S1  S2 and S4  S5 directly follow
from Pinsker’s inequality [25, Corollary p.16]. Similarly, the
relations S2  S3 and S5  S6 follow from [25, Corollary
p.18]; hence, we only need to prove that S3  S4.
Let ǫ, γ > 0. Assume that limn→∞ S3(pWZ, pW pZ) =
0, so that limn→∞ P[I(W ;Z) > ǫ] = 0. Note that metric
S4(pWZ, pW pZ) can be written as
S4(pWZ, pW pZ)
= 1
n
I(W ;Z)
= E
[
1
n
I(W ;Z)
]
,
= E
[
1
n
I(W ;Z)1 {I(W ;Z) 6 −ǫ}]
+ E
[
1
n
I(W ;Z)1 {−ǫ < I(W ;Z) 6 ǫ}]
+ E
[
1
n
I(W ;Z)1 {ǫ < I(W ;Z) 6 n(R+ γ)}]
+ E
[
1
n
I(W ;Z)1 {I(W ;Z) > n(R + γ)}].
Clearly, we have E
[
1
n
I(W ;Z)1 {I(W ;Z) 6 −ǫ}] < 0,
E
[
1
n
I(W ;Z)1 {−ǫ < I(W ;Z) 6 ǫ}] 6 ǫ
n
, and
E
[
1
n
I(W ;Z)1 {ǫ < I(W ;Z) 6 n(R+ γ)}]
6 (R+ γ)P[I(W ;Z) > ǫ].
Following [10, p. 223], we can also prove that
lim
n→∞
E
[
1
n
I(W ;Z)1 {I(W ;Z) > n(R+ γ)}] = 0.
Therefore, limn→∞ S4(pWZ, pW pZ) = 0 and S3  S4.
A direct consequence of Proposition 1 is that any secure
communication scheme satisfying the secrecy condition with
the strongest secrecy metric S1 automatically satisfies it with
the secrecy metrics Si for i ∈ J2, 6K. Conversely, any secure
communication scheme that does not satisfy the secrecy con-
dition with the weakest metric S6 cannot satisfy it with any of
the metrics Si for i ∈ J1, 5K. Therefore, to establish a coding
theorem for a secure communication scheme, we can prove
achievability with metric S1 and a converse with metric S6.
Although the ordering in Proposition 1 follows strictly
from mathematical properties, the idea that some metrics are
stronger than others is also meaningful from a cryptographic
perspective. One can construct examples of communication
schemes that present obvious security loopholes while still
satisfying a secrecy condition with metric S4 (see, for instance,
the examples in [4], [28], [29]). It is now accepted that
information-theoretic secrecy conditions6 should hold at least
with metrics S1 or S2.
IV. SECRECY FROM CHANNEL RESOLVABILITY FOR
SHANNON’S CIPHER SYSTEM
As a first illustration of the connection between secrecy and
channel resolvability, we elaborate on Example 1 and revisit
Shannon’s cipher system. We consider the model illustrated
in Figure 2, in which a message W uniformly distributed in
J1, 2nRK is to be communicated reliably from a transmitter
(Alice) to a legitimate receiver (Bob) in the presence of an
6The conditions could be further strengthened by imposing an exponential
convergence with n; however, except in the case of exponentially information
stable channels [5], such as memoryless channels, we were unable to prove
general results with this additional constraint.
ENCODER DECODER
Eve
K
Alice Bob
Z
WˆW
Fig. 2. Shannon’s cipher system for a general common source of randomness.
eavesdropper (Eve). Alice and Bob have access to a common
discrete source of randomness (K, {pK}n>1), characterized
by an alphabet K and a sequence of symbol probabilities
{pK}n>1, which is used to encode W into a codeword Z ∈ Z .
Bob’s estimate of the message using Z and the source of
randomness K is denoted by Wˆ .
Definition 1. A (2nR, n) cipher En consists of
• an encoding function fn : J1, 2nRK×Kn → Z;
• a decoding function gn : Z ×Kn → J1, 2nRK.
The reliability performance of a cipher En is measured in
terms of the probability of error Pe(En) , P
[
Wˆ 6= W |En
]
while its secrecy performance is measured in terms of the
secrecy metric7 Si(En) , Si(pWZ|En , pW pZ|En).
Definition 2. A rate R is achievable for secrecy metric Si for
Shannon’s cipher system if there exists a sequence of (2nR, n)
ciphers {En}n>1 such that
lim
n→∞Pe(En) = 0 and limn→∞ Si(En) = 0.
The secrecy capacity C(i)SC of Shannon’s cipher system is the
supremum of achievable rates for secrecy metric Si.
Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity of Shannon’s cipher system
is the same for all metrics Si with i ∈ J2, 6K and is given by
CSC = p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(K). (1)
If the source (K, {pK}n>1) is memoryless, then the secrecy
capacity is also the same for metric S1.
Proof: We first show that all rates below p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(K)
are achievable for secrecy metric S2. Let ǫ, γ > 0 and R ,
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(K) − γ. Let UR be the random variable with
uniform distribution on J1, 2nRK. By [27, Lemma 3], there
exists an encoding function fn : Kn → J1, 2nRK such that
V
(
pfn(K), pUR
)
6 ǫn with limn→∞ ǫn = 0. A message W
is then encoded as Z = fn(K) ⊕ W , where ⊕ represents
the addition modulo ⌈2nR⌉. By construction, Bob retrieves W
7We will drop the conditioning on En when this is clear from the context.
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without error since W = Z ⊕ fn(K). We have
S2(En) = V(pWZ , pW pZ)
= EW
[
V
(
pZ|W , pZ
)]
6 EW
[
V
(
pZ|W , pUR
)]
+ V(pUR , pZ)
6 2EW
[
V
(
pZ|W , pUR
)]
= 2EW
[
V
(
pfn(K), pUR
)]
6 2ǫn,
where we have used Lemma 7, the definition of Z , and the
independence of fn(K) and W . Therefore, the rate R is
achievable and, since γ can be chosen arbitrarily small, we
conclude that
C
(2)
SC > p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(K). (2)
If the source (K, pK) is i.i.d., one can modify the proof of [27,
Lemma 3] to show that, if R , H(K) − γ, there exists
a function fn : Kn → J1, 2nRK and αγ > 0, such that
V
(
pfn(K), pUR
)
6 2−αγn. Following the same steps as above,
we then obtain that S2(En) 6 2 ·2−αγn. Finally, [5, Lemma 1]
shows that there exists βγ > 0 such that, for n large enough
S1(En) 6 2−βγn.
We now prove the converse part of the result. Let R be an
achievable rate for secrecy metric S6. There exists a sequence
of (2nR, n) ciphers {En}n>1 such that limn→∞ Pe(En) = 0
and limn→∞ S6(En) = 0. For every n ∈ N∗, and with
probability one, we have
1
n
H(W ) = 1
n
H(W |Z) + 1
n
I(W ;Z)
= 1
n
I(W ;K|Z) + 1
n
H(W |ZK) + 1
n
I(W ;Z)
= 1
n
H(K)− 1
n
H(K|WZ)− 1
n
I(K;Z)
+ 1
n
H(W |ZK) + 1
n
I(W ;Z).
Since R = p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(W ), p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(K|WZ) > 0, and
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(K;Z) > 0, we obtain
R 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(K) + p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
H(W |ZK)
+ p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(W ;Z).
Note that p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(W ;Z) = 0 by assumption.
The Verdu´-Han Lemma [10], [26] also guarantees that
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
H(W |ZK) = 0; hence, we have
C
(6)
SC 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(K). (3)
Combining (2) and (3) with Proposition 1, we conclude that,
for every i ∈ J2, 6K, C(i)SC = p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(K). If the source is
memoryless, then for every i ∈ J1, 6K, C(i)SC = H(K).
The coding scheme used in Theorem 1 extracts the source
intrinsic randomness of (K, {pK}n>1) to protect the message
with a one-time pad. Nevertheless, the message is kept secret
from the eavesdropper because the encoder exploits the ran-
domness of the source to control the distribution of the eaves-
dropper’s observation; hence, the coding mechanism for secure
DECODER
DECODERENCODER
W0
X Y
Z
WYZ|X
Alice Bob
Eve
Wˆ1
Wˆ0
W˜0
W1
Fig. 3. Broadcast channel with confidential messages.
communication can be interpreted as channel resolvability,
which we confirm in the next section. From a cryptographic
perspective, Theorem 1 shows that the secure communication
rate is maximized if the legitimate terminals make sure that
their keys are almost perfectly uniform. This has operational
significance in a practical situation if the mechanism providing
secret keys is biased and does not yield perfectly uniform
keys. Finally, the fact that C(i)SC remains identical for all
metrics Si with i ∈ J2, 6K suggests that asymptotic statistical
independence is indeed a fundamental measure of secrecy.
V. SECRECY FROM CHANNEL RESOLVABILITY OVER
NOISY CHANNELS
We now turn our attention to the problem of secure commu-
nication over noisy channels. We consider a broadcast channel
with confidential messages
(X ,Y, {WYZ|X}n>1,Z) charac-
terized by an input alphabet X , two output alphabets Y and
Z , and a sequence of transition probabilities {WYZ|X}n>1.
The channels
(X , {WY|X}n>1,Y) and (X , {WZ|X}n>1,Z)
obtained from the marginals are called the main channel
and the eavesdropper’s channel, respectively. The inputs to
the channels are also subject to cost constraint P ∈ R+;
specifically, there exists a sequence of cost functions {cn}n>1
with cn : Xn → R+, such that any sequence x ∈ Xn
transmitted through the channel should satisfy 1
n
cn(x) 6 P .
Following standard practice, the transmitter is named Alice,
the receiver observing outputY is named Bob, and the receiver
observing output Z is named Eve. As illustrated in Figure 3,
Alice wishes to transmit a common message W0 to both Bob
and Eve and an individual message W1 for Bob alone, viewing
Eve as an eavesdropper for message W1. Bob’s estimates of
the messages are denoted by Wˆ0 and Wˆ1 while Eve’s estimate
is denoted by W˜0.
Definition 3. A
(
2nR0 , 2nR1 , n
)
wiretap code Cn consists of
• a common message set W0 = J1, 2nR0K;
• an individual message set W1 = J1, 2nR1K;
• an auxiliary message set W ′ = J1, 2nR′nK, with R′n > 0,8
used to randomize the encoding of messages;
• a source of local randomness (R, pR), which is only
known to Alice and can be used to further randomize
the encoding;
• an encoding function fn : W0 ×W1 ×W ′ ×R → Xn,
such that 1
n
cn(fn(m0,m1,m
′, r)) 6 P ;
• a decoding function gn : Yn →W0 ×W1 ×W ′;
• a decoding function hn : Zn →W0.
8Although R0 and R1 are fixed parameters, we allow R′n to vary with n.
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The auxiliary message is denoted by W ′. All messages
W0,W1,W
′ are assumed to be uniformly distributed in their
respective sets. The size of the auxiliary message set and
the source of local randomness (R, pR) can be optimized as
part of the code design, and the eavesdropper is assumed
to know the code Cn, which includes the statistics pR of
the source of local randomness. In the remainder of the
paper, we clearly identify the channel inputs and outputs
obtained when using a code Cn by introducing a bar in the
notation of the corresponding random variables. For instance,
the random variable representing a codeword chosen in Cn
is denoted X¯, those representing the corresponding channel
outputs are denoted Y¯ and Z¯. The joint distribution between
W0,W1, X¯, Y¯, Z¯ is
pW0W1X¯Y¯Z¯(m0,m1,x,y, z) = WYZ|X(y, z|x)
pX¯|W0W1(x|m0,m1) pW0(m0) pW1(m1) . (4)
The reliability of a code Cn is measured in terms of the average
probability of error
Pe(Cn) ,
P
[
(Wˆ0, Wˆ1, Wˆ
′) 6= (W0,W1,W ′) or W˜0 6= W0
∣∣∣Cn]
while its secrecy is measured in terms of the secrecy metric
Si(Cn) , Si(pW1Z¯|Cn , pW1pZ¯|Cn) for i ∈ J1, 6K.
Definition 4. A rate pair (R0, R1) is achievable for secrecy
metric Si over a broadcast channel if there exists a sequence
of (2nR0 , 2nR1 , n) codes {Cn}n>1 such that
lim
n→∞
Pe(Cn) = 0 and lim
n→∞
Si(Cn) = 0.
The secrecy-capacity region R(i)BCC is the closure of the set of
rate pairs achievable for secrecy metric Si, and the secrecy
capacity for secrecy metric Si is
C (i)WT , sup{R1 : (0, R1) is achievable for secrecy metric Si}.
In the absence of a common message (R0 = 0), a
broadcast channel with confidential messages is concisely
called a wiretap channel, and a (1, 2nR1 , n) code is simply
denoted as a (2nR1 , n) code. Note that our definition of a
wiretap code explicitly introduces the randomness used in the
encoding process. The randomness is split between a source
of local randomness and an auxiliary message with uniform
distribution that we require the legitimate receiver to decode.
This allows us to distinguish the part of the randomness that
merely acts as artificial random noise from the part that helps
secrecy without reducing the reliable communication rate.
Since the source of local randomness can be arbitrarily chosen,
our definition incurs no loss of generality and allows us to
explicitly define the class of capacity-based wiretap codes in
Section V-A.
Remark 1. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2] analyze the fundamental
limits of secure communication more precisely by studying
the rate-equivocation region (R0, R1, Re), where Re 6 R1
represents the equivocation-rate 1
n
H
(
W1|Z¯
)
of the eavesdrop-
per about the individual message. Unlike the rates R0 and
R1, the notion of equivocation depends on the secrecy metric
considered; therefore, we restrict ourselves to the special case
of full secrecy rates R1 = Re, for which we can leverage the
result of Proposition 1.
A. Capacity-Based Wiretap Codes and Strong Secrecy
We now define the subclass of capacity-based wiretap
codes.
Definition 5. A
(
2nR0 , 2nR1 , n
)
capacity-based wiretap code
Cn is a
(
2nR0 , 2nR1 , n
)
wiretap code such that :
• the auxiliary message rate is R′n = Ce − ǫn, where
Ce is the eavesdropper’s channel capacity and {ǫn}n>1
satisfies limn→∞ ǫn = 0;
• there exists a decoding function h′n : Zn ×W1 → W ′,
which allows the eavesdropper to estimate the auxiliary
message W ′ from the observation of Z¯ and W1.
We let W˜ ′ denote Eve’s estimate of W ′. The reliability of
a capacity-based wiretap code Cn is then measured in terms
of the modified average probability of error
P
∗
e(Cn) , P
[
(Wˆ0, Wˆ1, Wˆ
′) 6= (W0,W1,W ′)
or (W˜0, W˜
′) 6= (W0,W ′)
∣∣∣Cn] .
Definition 6. A rate pair (R0, R1) is achievable for secrecy
metric Si with capacity-based wiretap codes if there exists
a sequence of (2nR0 , 2nR1 , n) capacity-based wiretap codes
{Cn}n>1 such that
lim
n→∞
P
∗
e(Cn) = 0 and lim
n→∞
Si(Cn) = 0.
The constraint limn→∞ P∗e(Cn) = 0 ensures that, given
knowledge of Z¯ and W1, the eavesdropper could reliably
decode the auxiliary message W ′. Nevertheless, since the
eavesdropper does not have access to the message W1, this
property is solely used to impose structure on the code.
However, note that this also imposes limn→∞ ǫn
√
n =∞ [30,
Theorem 49]. The denomination “capacity-based code” is used
because the set of codewords associated to a known pair of
messages (W0,W1) forms a sub-code of rate R′n = Ce − ǫn,
which stems from a sequence of capacity-achieving codes for
Eve’s channel.
As formalized in [31, Theorem 1], capacity-based wiretap
codes are implicitly used in most works that show the existence
of wiretap codes achieving secrecy rates for metric S4. In
this section, we show that this may be an intrinsic limitation,
by proving that sequences of random capacity-based wiretap
codes that achieve the weak secrecy capacity cannot achieve
the strong secrecy capacity.
Specifically, we consider a discrete memoryless wiretap
channel
(X ,Y,WY Z|X ,Z) without cost constraint (∀x ∈
Xn cn(x) = n and P = 1) in which the eavesdropper’s
channel and the main channel are both symmetric.9 We further
assume that the main channel is more capable than the
eavesdropper’s channel and has capacity Cm < 12 log |X | bits.
The former assumption ensures that, without loss of optimality,
we can assume no source of local randomness (R, pR) is
9More specifically, we use Gallager’s notion of symmetry [32, p. 94].
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available [2] and that the secrecy capacity is Cs = Cm −Ce;
the latter one is a technical assumption required to simplify
the analysis.
Proposition 2. Let {Cn}n>1 be a sequence of (2nR, n)
random capacity-based wiretap codes, obtained by generating
codeword symbols independently and uniformly at random.
Let the rate R′n of the auxiliary message be such that R′n =
Ce − ǫn and R+R′n = Cm− ǫn. Then, there exists η, α > 0,
such that, for n sufficiently large,
P[S2(Cn) > η, P
∗
e(Cn) 6 ǫ
′
n and S4(Cn) 6 3ǫ′n]
> 1− 2−αnǫ2n ,
with ǫ′n , max(ǫn, log |X | 2−αnǫ
2
n , n−1), i.e., with high
probability over the random code ensemble, a sequence of
capacity-based random codes achieves the weak secrecy ca-
pacity but does not achieve the strong secrecy capacity.
Proof: See Appendix B
We conjecture that the inability to achieve strong secrecy
holds for any capacity-based wiretap codes, and not just
random codes, as well as for any discrete memoryless channel,
and not just symmetric channels. Despite its lack of gener-
ality, Proposition 2 shows that a random coding argument
with capacity-based wiretap codes is not powerful enough to
prove strong secrecy results, which suggests exploiting a more
powerful mechanism to ensure secrecy. In the remainder of the
paper, we derive secrecy from channel resolvability and show
that the resulting codes do not suffer from the limitations of
capacity-based wiretap codes.
Remark 2. If the main channel is noiseless and the eaves-
dropper’s channel is symmetric, a slight modification of the
proof of Proposition 2 shows that no capacity-based wiretap
code (including non-random codes) achieves secrecy capacity
for metrics S2 and S1. This fact was independently noted
in [33] for metric S1 using results for finite blocklength
channel coding [30]. Our approach builds on a similar result
established for secret-key agreement in [34].
B. General Broadcast Channels with Confidential Messages
and Cost Constraint
In this section, we establish the secrecy-capacity region of
a general broadcast channel with confidential messages for
secrecy metrics Si with i ∈ J2, 6K; the alphabets and transition
probabilities of the channel {WYZ|X}n>1 are arbitrary, so that
the model includes continuous channels and channels with
memory. Following the conclusions drawn from Proposition 2,
we analyze codes that are more powerful than capacity-based
wiretap codes and whose secrecy is tied to the notion of
channel resolvability.
Theorem 2. The secrecy-capacity region of a broadcast chan-
nel
(X ,Y, {WYZ|X}n>1,Z) with confidential messages and
cost constraint P is the same for all secrecy metrics Si with
i ∈ J2, 6K and is given by
RBCC =
⋃
{UVX}n>1∈P


(R0, R1) ∈ R2+ :
R0 6 min
(
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Y),
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Z)
)
,
R1 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Y|U)
− p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Z|U)


(5)
where
P , {{UVX}n>1 : ∀n ∈ N∗U→ V→ X→ YZ forms
a Markov chain and P
[
1
n
cn(X) 6 P
]
= 1
}
.
Notice that the form of the secrecy-capacity region is
the natural generalization of that obtained for memoryless
channels in [2, Corollary 1]; however, the main channel
statistics affect the secure rate R1 through their “worst
realization” p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Y|U) while the eavesdropper’s
channel statistics affect it through their “best realization”
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Z|U). Intuitively, as illustrated in Figure 4,
this occurs because the worst case for secure communication
is when the main channel conveys the smallest information
rate to the legitimate receiver while the eavesdropper’s channel
leaks the largest information rate to the eavesdropper. It
will be apparent in the proof that this asymmetry, which
disappears in the case of memoryless channels, arises because
the coding mechanisms used to ensure reliability and secrecy
are different.
limit distribution of 1
n
I(V;Z|U)
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Y|U)
R1
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Y|U)
limit distribution of 1
n
I(V;Y|U)
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Z|U) p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Z|U)
Fig. 4. Illustration of secure rates in Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2: We start with the achievability part
of the proof, for which we create a codebook by combining
superposition coding and binning schemes. Let n ∈ N∗ and
ǫ, γ, R0, R1, R
′ > 0. Define M0 , ⌈2nR0⌉, M1 , ⌈2nR1⌉
and M ′ , ⌈2nR′⌉. Let U be an arbitrary alphabet and fix a
distribution pU on Un. Fix a conditional distribution pX|U on
Xn ×Un such that P[ 1
n
cn(X) 6 P
]
= 1. Let U,X,Y,Z be
the random variables with joint distribution
pUXYZ(u,x,y, z) , WYZ|X(y, z|x)pX|U(x|u)pU(u). (6)
• Code generation: Randomly generate M0 sequences
uk ∈ Un with k ∈ J1,M0K according to pU. For each
k ∈ J1,M0K, generate M1M ′ sequences xklm ∈ Xn
with (l,m) ∈ J1,M1K × J1,M ′K according to pX|U=uk .
We denote by Cn the random variable representing the
generated code and by Cn
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• Encoding: To transmit a message pair (k, l) ∈ J1,M0K×
J1,M1K, Alice generates an auxiliary message m uni-
formly at random in J1,M ′K and sends the codeword
xklm through the channel.
• Bob’s decoding: Define the sets
T n1 , {(u,y) ∈ Un × Yn :
1
n
log
pY|U(y|u)
pY(y)
>
1
n
logM0 + γ
}
,
T n2 , {(u,x,y) ∈ Un ×Xn × Yn :
1
n
log
pY|XU(y|x,u)
pY|U(y|u) >
1
n
logM1M
′ + γ
}
.
Upon observing y, Bob decodes k as the received com-
mon message if uk is the unique sequence in Cn such that
(uk,y) ∈ T n1 ; otherwise, a random message is chosen.
Similarly, he decodes l as the received individual message
and m as the received auxiliary message if there exists
a unique codeword xklm such that (uk,xklm,y) ∈ T n2 ;
otherwise, random messages are chosen.
• Eve’s decoding: Define the set
T n3 , {(u, z) ∈ Un ×Zn :
1
n
log
pZ|U(z|u)
pZ(z)
>
1
n
logM0 + γ
}
.
Upon observing z, Eve decodes k as the received com-
mon message if uk is the unique sequence such that
(uk, z) ∈ T n3 ; otherwise, a random message is chosen.
The following lemmas, whose proofs are relegated to Ap-
pendix C, provide sufficient conditions to guarantee reliability
and secrecy.
Lemma 1 (Reliability conditions).
If R0 6 min
(
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Y)− 2γ,
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Z) − 2γ
)
and R1 +R′ 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Y|U)− 2γ,
then limn→∞ E[Pe(Cn)] 6 ǫ.
Lemma 2 (Secrecy from channel resolvability condition).
If R′ > p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Z|U) + 2γ
then lim
n→∞
E[S2(Cn)] 6 ǫ.
Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we obtain that if
R0 6 min
(
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Y)− 2γ
, p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Z) − 2γ
)
and R1 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Y|U)
− p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Z|U) − 4γ,
then, limn→∞ E[Pe(Cn)] 6 ǫ and limn→∞ E[S2(Cn)] 6 ǫ.
By Markov’s inequality and the union bound, there exists at
least one sequence of (2nR0 , 2nR1 , n) codes {Cn}n>1 such
that limn→∞ Pe(Cn) 6 3ǫ and limn→∞ S2(Cn) 6 3ǫ. Since ǫ
and γ can be chosen arbitrarily small, we conclude that
⋃
{UX}n>1∈P


(R0, R1) ∈ R2+ :
R0 6 min
(
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Y),
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Z)
)
,
R1 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Y|U)
− p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Z|U)


⊆ R(2)BCC
(7)
where
P , {{UX}n>1 : ∀n ∈ N∗U→ X→ YZ forms
a Markov chain and P
[
1
n
cn(X) 6 P
]
= 1
}
.
Finally, note that the source of local randomness (R, pR) can
be used to prefix an arbitrary channel
(V , {pX|V}n>1,X )
to the broadcast channel
(X ,Y, {WYZ|X}n>1,Z). That this
prefix is useful for secrecy applications is well established [2].
By applying the proof above to the concatenated channel(V ,Y, {pYZ|V}n>1,Z), we conclude that the region given
in Theorem 2 is included in the capacity region R(2)BCC.
We now turn to the converse part of the proof. Consider a
sequence of codes {Cn}n>1 achieving the rate pair (R0, R1)
for secrecy metric S6. For n ∈ N∗, let U¯ denote the choice of
a common message uniformly at random in J1, 2nR0K and let
W¯ denote the choice of an individual message uniformly at
random in J1, 2nR1K. Let Y¯ and Z¯ denote the channel outputs
corresponding to the transmission of the message pair (U¯,W¯).
As shown in Appendix D, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 3. If limn→∞ Pe(Cn) = 0 and limn→∞ S6(Cn) = 0,
then
R0 6 min
(
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I
(
U¯; Y¯
)
, p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I
(
U¯; Z¯
))
R1 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W¯; Y¯|U¯)− p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W¯; Z¯|U¯).
Note that, by assumption, U¯W¯ → X¯ → Y¯Z¯ forms a
Markov chain. Define V¯ , (U¯,W¯), which is such that
U¯→ V¯→ X¯→ Y¯Z¯ forms a Markov chain. With probability
one, we have
I
(
W¯; Y¯|U¯) = I(V¯; Y¯|U¯) and I(W¯; Z¯|U¯) = I(V¯; Z¯|U¯);
therefore, an achievable pair (R0, R1) must satisfy
R0 6 min
(
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I
(
U¯; Y¯
)
, p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I
(
U¯; Z¯
))
,
and R1 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I
(
V¯; Y¯|U¯)− p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I
(
V¯; Z¯|U¯),
where U¯→ V¯→ X¯→ Y¯Z¯ forms a Markov chain, pY¯Z¯|X¯ =
WYZ|X, and P
[
1
n
cn(X¯) 6 P
]
= 1. Taking the union over all
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possible processes {U¯V¯X¯}n>1 gives the desired outer bound
for the secrecy-capacity region R(6)BCC.
Since the outer bound for R(6)BCC and the inner bound for
R(2)BCC match, we conclude using Proposition 1 that the secrecy-
capacity region is the same for all metrics i ∈ J2, 6K.
A few comments regarding Theorem 2 are now in or-
der. First, the achievability part of the proof is based on
an explicit operational interpretation of secrecy in terms of
channel resolvability; in Lemma 2, codes are constructed so
that, for a given message W0 and taking the average over
the random codebook selection, the probability distribution
induced at the eavesdropper’s channel output by all messages
W1 is asymptotically the same in the sense of variational
distance. Second, the existence of a sequence of codes simul-
taneously satisfying the reliability and secrecy conditions is
obtained by handling the constraints separately, as illustrated
by the separate results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. This
contrasts with the approach of [1], [2], in which the two
constraints are handled somewhat simultaneously by using
capacity-based wiretap codes. As should be clear from the
condition R′ > p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Z|U) obtained in Lemma 2,
the codes constructed are not capacity-based wiretap codes, for
which the condition would read R′ < p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Z|U);
essentially, channel resolvability enables the analysis of codes
operating at rates beyond the capacity of the eavesdropper’s
channel. Finally, we note that, as in Section IV, the secrecy-
capacity region is invariant with respect to the metrics Si
for i ∈ J2, 6K; nevertheless, practical coding schemes should
be designed to provide secrecy with respect to the strongest
metric.
Remark 3. If the eavesdropper’s channel is exponentially
information stable, so that
PUXZ
[
1
n
I(X;Z|U) > 1
n
logM ′ + ǫ
]
decays exponentially fast with n for any ǫ > 0, then a
closer look at the proof of Theorem 2 shows that S2(Cn),
and consequently S1(Cn), would also decay exponentially fast
with n. We do not explore this issue further for arbitrary
channels but we analyze it more precisely in the next section
for memoryless channels.
Without a common message (R0 = 0), we obtain in a
similar way the secrecy capacity of a general wiretap channel
established by Hayashi [6, Theorem 5].
Corollary 1. The secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel(X ,Y, {WYZ|X}n>1,Z) with cost constraint P is identical
for secrecy metrics Si with i ∈ J2, 6K and is given by
Cs = sup
{VX}n>1∈P
(
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Y)
−p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Z)
)
, (8)
where
P , {{VX}n>1 : ∀n ∈ N∗,V→ X→ YZ forms
a Markov chain and P
[
1
n
cn(X) 6 P
]
= 1
}
.
C. Memoryless Broadcast Channels with Additive Cost Con-
straint
We now consider memoryless channels (not necessarily
discrete) with an additive cost constraint. This is a special
case of the general model, in which the transition probabilities
factor as
WYZ|X(y, z|x) =
n∏
i=1
WY Z|X(yi, zi|xi)
and the cost constraint satisfies cn(x) =
∑n
i=1 c(xi) for
some cost function c : X → R+. For this special class of
channels and constraints, and under mild conditions, the result
of Section V-B extends to metric S1. For discrete memoryless
channels without cost constraint, this result was obtained
independently in [35], [36] using secure multiplex coding and
privacy amplification.
Theorem 3. The secrecy-capacity region of a memoryless
broadcast channel
(X ,Y,WY Z|X ,Z) with confidential mes-
sages and additive cost constraint P is the same for all secrecy
metrics Si with i ∈ J2, 4K and is given by
RBCC =
⋃
(UV X)∈P


(R0, R1) ∈ R2+ :
R0 6 min (I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z))
R1 6 I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)

 , (9)
where
P , {(UVX) : U → V → X → Y Z forms a
Markov chain and E[c(X)] 6 P} .
If the rates on the boundary of RBCC are obtained for some
random variables UV XY Z such that the integrals defining
the moment generating functions of I(V ;Z|U) and c(X) con-
verge uniformly in a neighborhood of 0 and are differentiable
at 0, then RBCC is also the secrecy-capacity region for metric
S1.
Proof: See Appendix E.
The conditions that yield RBCC for metric S1 are suffi-
cient conditions required to obtain exponential upper bounds
when applying Chernov bounds. These conditions are not
too restrictive and are automatically satisfied for discrete
memoryless channels and for Gaussian channels with additive
power constraint. Improved exponents can be obtained in such
cases using techniques as in [37].
In the absence of a common message (R0 = 0), we obtain in
a similar way the following result, which was already obtained
for discrete memoryless channels by Csisza´r [5] and Maurer
and Wolf [16] with different techniques.
Corollary 2. The secrecy capacity of a memoryless wiretap
channel
(X ,Y,WY Z|X ,Z) with additive cost constraint P is
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the same for all secrecy metrics Si with i ∈ J2, 4K and is given
by
Cs = sup
(VX)∈P
(I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)) ,
where
P , {(V X) : V → X → Y Z forms a Markov chain
and E[c(X)] 6 P} .
If the random variables V XY Z maximizing Cs are such
that the integrals defining the moment generating functions
of I(V ;Z) and c(X) converge uniformly in a neighborhood
of 0 and are differentiable at 0, then Cs is also the secrecy
capacity for metric S1.
For general memoryless channels, the converse part of
Theorem 3 and Corollary 2 follows from standard arguments
with metric S4 [2]; however, for discrete memoryless channels,
the converse is obtained by specializing Theorem 2 and holds
for metric S6.
Remark 4. In the proof of Theorem 3, we can actually
establish a stronger result than the one stated. If the conditions
for the moment generating functions of I(V ;Z|U) and c(X)
are satisfied, we can show that S1(Cn) vanishes exponentially
fast with n.
VI. APPLICATIONS
In this section, we illustrate the usefulness of deriving
secrecy from channel resolvability by considering several
problems in which the derivation of achievable secrecy rates
is tremendously simplified. In particular, results for wireless
channels, mixed wiretap channels and compound wiretap
channels come almost “for free”. For simplicity, we only
consider cases in which the common message rate is zero
(R0 = 0).
A. Ergodic Wireless Channels with Full CSI
We consider the situation in which Alice and Bob commu-
nicate over an ergodic-fading wiretap channel and have access
to the instantaneous fading gains for both the main channel and
the eavesdropper’s channel. Specifically, at each time k > 1,
the relationships between input and outputs are given by
Yk = Hm,kXk +Nm,k,
Zk = He,kXk +Ne,k,
where {Hm,k}k>1, {He,k}k>1 are fading gains known to
all parties and {Nm,k}k>1, {Ne,k}k>1 are i.i.d. complex
Gaussian zero-mean noise processes with respective variance
σ2m and σ2e . In addition, the channel inputs are subject to the
long-term power constraint 1
n
∑n
k=1 E
[
X2k
]
6 P .
Proposition 3. The secrecy capacity of the ergodic wireless
channel with full CSI for secrecy metric S1 is
Cs = max
γ
E
[
log
(
1 +
|Hm|2 γ(Hm, He)
σ2m
)
− log
(
1 +
|He|2 γ(Hm, He)
σ2e
)]
, (10)
where the maximization is over all power allocation functions
γ : C2 → R+ such that E[γ(Hm, He)] 6 P .
Sketch of proof: We only sketch the achievability part
of the proof; the converse for secrecy metric S4 is established
in [12]. Because the channel gains are instantaneously known
to all parties, the ergodic wireless channel can be demulti-
plexed into a set of independent Gaussian wiretap channels,
each characterized by a specific realization (hm, he) of the
channel gains and subject to a power constraint γ(hm, he).
Upon substituting V = 0 and X ∼ N (0, γ(hm, he)) in
Corollary 2, we obtain the following achievable rate for metric
S1 and for each channel:
log
(
1 +
|hm|2 γ(hm, he)
σ2m
)
− log
(
1 +
|he|2 γ(hm, he)
σ2e
)
.
Hence, using the ergodicity of the channel, we conclude that
all the rates R > 0 such that
R < max
γ
E
[
log
(
1 +
|Hm|2 γ(Hm, He)
σ2m
)
− log
(
1 +
|He|2 γ(Hm, He)
σ2e
)]
are achievable for metric S1, where γ : C2 → R+ satisfies
E[γ(Hm, He) 6 P ].
The result of Proposition 3 has already been established
in [28] with a completely different approach; deriving secrecy
from channel resolvability and leveraging Corollary 2 provides
a much simpler and direct proof, which can be generalized to
include the effect of imperfect CSI [38], [39].
B. Mixed and Compound Channels with receiver CSI
As another application, we study mixed and compound
wiretap channels with receiver CSI. These models have prac-
tical relevance since they allow one to analyze situations in
which the channel is imperfectly known to the transmitter, ei-
ther because the channel estimation mechanism is imperfect or
because the channel is partially controlled by the eavesdropper.
Let K ∈ N∗ and let {αk}k∈J1,KK be such that ∀k ∈
J1,KK αk > 0 and
∑K
k=1 αk = 1. Consider the wiretap
channels (X ,Y,{WYkZk|X}n>1 ,Z) for k ∈ J1,KK. The
mixed wiretap channel is the channel
(X ,Y,WYZ|X,Z)
whose transition probabilities satisfy
WYZ|X(y, z|x) =
K∑
k=1
αkWYkZk|X(y, z|x).
Proposition 4. The secrecy capacity of the mixed wiretap
channel with power constraint P is the same for all secrecy
metrics Si with i ∈ J2, 6K and is given by
sup
{V,X}n>1∈P
(
min
k∈J1,KK
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Yk)
− max
k∈J1,KK
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Zk)
)
, (11)
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where
P , {{VX}n>1 : ∀n ∈ N∗, ∀k ∈ J1,KK, V→ X→ YkZk
forms a Markov chain and P[ 1
n
cn(X) 6 P
]
= 1
}
.
Proof: Using [10, Lemma 1.4.2], we obtain
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Y) = min
k∈J1,KK
(
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Yk)
)
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Z) = max
k∈J1,KK
(
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Zk)
)
.
The result follows by substituting these equalities in Corol-
lary 1.
Note that for i ∈ J1, 2K, we have Si(pW Z¯, pW pZ¯) 6∑K
k=1 αkSi(pW Z¯k , pW pZ¯k). Therefore, a code ensuring se-
crecy for the mixed wiretap channel may not guarantee secrecy
over each individual wiretap channel. If one wants to ensure
secrecy over all possible K channels, one must consider a
compound wiretap channel, in which the transmitter has no
knowledge (even statistical knowledge) of which channel in
the set is used for transmission; however, to avoid unnecessary
mathematical complications, we assume that receivers can
estimate channel statistics perfectly and always know from
which channel they obtain observations; hence, we refer to this
model as a compound channel with receiver CSI. For every
channel k ∈ J1,KK, the performance of a code Cn is measured
in terms of the average probability of error P(k)e (Cn) and in
terms of the secrecy metric S(k)i (Cn) , Si(pW Z¯k , pW pZ¯k); the
notion of achievable rate is accordingly modified as follows.
Definition 7. A rate R is achievable over a compound wiretap
channel with receiver CSI for secrecy metric Si if there exists
a sequence of (2nR, n) wiretap codes {Cn}n>1 such that
∀k ∈ J1,KK lim
n→∞P
(k)
e (Cn) = 0 and lim
n→∞ S
(k)
i (Cn) = 0.
Unlike the mixed wiretap channel, there is no distribution
associated to the choice of the channel in the set, and secrecy
and reliability must be guaranteed for any realized channel.
Proposition 5. The secrecy capacity of a compound wiretap
channel with receiver CSI and with cost constraint P is the
same for all secrecy metrics Si with i ∈ J2, 6K and is given by
sup
{V,X}n>1∈P
(
min
k∈J1,KK
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Yk)
− max
k∈J1,KK
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(V;Zk)
)
, (12)
where
P , {{VX}n>1 : ∀n ∈ N∗, ∀k ∈ J1,KK, V→ X→ YkZk
forms a Markov chain and P[ 1
n
cn(X) 6 P
]
= 1
}
.
Proof: We start with the achievability part of the proof,
which is similar to that of Theorem 2. Let n ∈ N∗ and
ǫ, γ, R1, R
′ > 0. Define M1 , ⌈2nR1⌉ and M ′ , ⌈2nR′⌉.
Fix a distribution pX on Xn such that P
[
1
n
cn(X) 6 P
]
= 1.
Let X, {Yk}k∈J1,KK, {Zk}k∈J1,KK be the random variables
with joint distribution
∀k ∈ J1,KK pXYkZk(x,y, z) , WYkZk|X(y, z|x)pX(x) .
• Code generation: Randomly generate M1M ′ sequences
xlm ∈ Xn with (l,m) ∈ J1,M1K × J1,M ′K according
to pX. We denote by Cn the random random variable
representing the generated code and by Cn one of its
realizations.
• Encoding: To transmit a message l ∈ J1,M1K, Alice
generates an auxiliary message m uniformly at random
in J1,M ′K and transmits the codeword xlm through the
channel.
• Bob’s decoding for channel k ∈ J1,KK: Define the set
T nk , {(x,y) ∈ Xn × Ynk :
1
n
log
WYk|X(y|x)
pYk(y)
>
1
n
logM1M
′ + γ
}
.
Note that the decoding rule depends on the channel index
k since we have assumed that Bob knows which channel
is being observed. Upon observing yk , Bob decodes l as
the received individual message and m as the received
auxiliary message if there exists a unique codeword xlm
such that (xlm,yk) ∈ T nk ; otherwise, a random message
is chosen.
The following lemmas provide sufficient conditions to guar-
antee reliability and secrecy. Their proofs are similar to those
provided in Appendix C and are omitted.
Lemma 4 (Reliability conditions). For each k ∈ J1,KK,
If R1 +R′ 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Yk)− 2γ
then lim
n→∞E[P
(k)
e (Cn)] 6 ǫ.
Lemma 5 (Secrecy from channel resolvability condition). For
each k ∈ J1,KK,
If R′ > p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Zk) + 2γ then lim
n→∞E[S
(k)
2 (Cn)] 6 ǫ.
Using Lemmas 4 and 5, we obtain that if
R1 6 min
k∈J1,KK
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Yk)
− max
k∈J1,KK
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Zk)− 4γ
then ∀k ∈ J1,KK
{
limn→∞ E[P(k)e (Cn)] 6 ǫ
limn→∞ E[S(k)2 (Cn)] 6 ǫ
.
Using Markov’s inequality and the union bound, we can
show there exists at least one sequence of (2nR1 , n) codes
{Cn}n>1 such that
∀k ∈ J1,KK lim
n→∞
P
(k)
e (Cn) 6 (K + 1)ǫ
and lim
n→∞
S
(k)
2 (Cn) 6 (K + 1)ǫ.
Since K is fixed and ǫ, γ can be chosen arbitrarily small, we
conclude that all rates R1 such that
0 6 R1 < sup
{X}n>1∈P
(
min
k∈J1,KK
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Yk)
− max
k∈J1,KK
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Zk)
)
(13)
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are achievable, where
P , {{Xn}n>1 : P[ 1ncn(X) 6 P ] = 1} .
The achievability of the rates below the secrecy capacity C (2)s
in (12) is then obtained by introducing a prefix channel as in
the proof of Theorem 2.
We now turn to the converse part of the proof. Consider
a sequence of wiretap codes {Cn}n>1 achieving rate R1 for
secrecy metric S6. For n ∈ N∗, let V¯ denote the choice of
a message uniformly at random in J1, 2nR1K. By definition,
for every n ∈ N∗ and k ∈ J1,KK, V¯ → X¯ → Y¯kZ¯k forms
a Markov chain and P
[
1
n
c(X¯) 6 P
]
= 1. By the Verdu´-Han
Lemma [26, Theorem 4], we obtain
R1 6 min
k∈J1,KK
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I
(
V¯; Y¯k
)
. (14)
By definition of the metric S6, we also have
max
k∈J1,KK
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I
(
V¯; Z¯k
)
= 0. (15)
Subtracting (15) to (14), and maximizing over all processes
{V¯X¯}, we obtain the desired result.
Although the secrecy capacity of a compound wiretap
channel with receiver CSI is identical to that of a mixed
wiretap channel, the coding schemes achieving it may be
fundamentally different.
Proposition 6. Given a memoryless compound wiretap chan-
nel with receiver CSI and additive cost constraint P , all rates
R1 such that
0 6 R1 < sup
(VX)∈P
(
min
k∈J1,KK
I(V ;Yk)− max
k∈J1,KK
I(V ;Zk)
)
(16)
are achievable for secrecy metrics Si with i ∈ J2, 6K, where
P , {V X : ∀k ∈ J1,KK, V → X → YkZk forms
a Markov chain and E[c(X)] 6 P} .
If the random variables maximizing (16) are such that, for
all k ∈ J1,KK, the integrals defining the moment generating
functions of I(V ;Yk) and c(X) converge uniformly in a
neighborhood of 0 and are differentiable at 0, then the rates
are also achievable for metric S1.
Proof: The proof of Proposition 6 follows from steps
similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 5 and
Theorem 3 and is omitted.
If the receivers do not know which channel they observe,
the counterpart of Proposition 6 was independently derived
in [40]. Note that deriving secrecy from channel resolvability
circumvents the enhancement argument used in [41, Theorem
1], which is required to show achievability using capacity-
based wiretap codes. Similarly, when applied to Gaussian com-
pound wiretap channels with power constraint, Proposition 6
strengthens [42, Theorem 1] with receiver CSI.
Remark 5. The general result of Proposition 5 holds provided
the number of channels K is fixed and independent of the
number n of channel uses; nevertheless, in the special case of
public authenticated channel
ENCODER DECODER
X Y
KˆK
BobAlice
pXYZ
Z
Eve
A
Fig. 5. Secret-key agreement from general source.
Proposition 6, for which we establish secrecy for metric S1,
we can show that, for each k ∈ J1,KK, S(k)1 6 (K + 1)2−ǫkn
for some ǫk > 0. Therefore, Proposition 6 also holds if the
number of compound channels grows exponentially with n as
K = 2βn with β < mink∈J1,KK ǫk.
C. Secret-Key Agreement from General Sources.
As a last application, we exploit a connection between
secret-key agreement and wiretap coding to analyze the
fundamental limits of secret-key agreement for a general
source model. Specifically, we consider a discrete source
(X ,Y,Z, {pXYZ}n>1) with three components taking values
in discrete alphabets. As illustrated in Figure 5, Alice and Bob
attempt to distill a secret key from their correlated observations
X and Y, respectively, and a message transmitted by Alice
over public authenticated channel with unlimited capacity. The
key should remain secret from an eavesdropper who observes
Z and the public message.
Definition 8. A (2nR, n) key-distillation strategy Sn consists
of:
• a key alphabet K = J1, 2nRK;
• an alphabet A used by Alice to communicate over the
public channel;
• a source of local randomness for Alice (RX , pRX );
• a source of local randomness for Bob (RY , pRY );
• an encoding function f : Xn ×RX → A;
• a key-distillation function κa : Xn ×RX → K;
• a key-distillation function κb : Yn ×A×RY → K;
The random variables corresponding to the public mes-
sage, Alice’s key, and Bob’s key are denoted by A, K , and
Kˆ, respectively. The performance of a secret-key distillation
strategy Sn is measured in terms of the average probability
of error Pe(Sn) , P
[
K 6= Kˆ
∣∣∣Sn], the secrecy of the key
Si(Sn) , Si(pKZA|Sn , pK|SnpZA|Sn) for i ∈ J1, 6K, and the
uniformity of the key U(Sn) , log⌈2nR⌉ −H(K).
Definition 9. A key rate R is achievable for secrecy metric Si
for a source if there exists a sequence {Sn}n>1 of
(
2nR, n
)
key-distillation strategies such that
lim
n→∞
Pe(Sn) = 0, lim
n→∞
Si(Sn) = 0, lim
n→∞
U(Sn) = 0.
The forward secret-key capacity C (i)SK is the supremum of
achievable key rates for metric Si.
Proposition 7. The forward secret-key capacity of a discrete
source (X ,Y,Z, {pXYZ}n>1) for secrecy metrics Si with i ∈
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J2, 6K satisfies
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(X|Z)− p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
H(X|Y) 6 C (i)SK
6 min
(
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Y), p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Y|Z)
)
. (17)
If the discrete source is i.i.d., Proposition 7 holds for secrecy
metric S1, as already known from [5], [16].
Corollary 3. The secret-key capacity of an i.i.d discrete source
(X ,Y,Z, pXY Z) for secrecy metric S1 satisfies
max (I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z), I(X ;Y )− I(Y ;Z))
6 C (1)SK 6 min (I(X ;Y ), I(X,Y |Z)) .
Proof of Theorem 7 and Corollary 3: The achievability
part of Theorem 7 is based on the construction of a conceptual
wiretap channel as in [13]. Assume that Alice, Bob and Eve
observe n realizations X, Y and Z of the source, respectively.
Consider an arbitrary process {U}n>1 such that U ∈ Xn.
Assume that Alice forms the signal U ⊕ X on the public
channel, in which ⊕ denotes the symbol-wise modulo-X
addition. This operation creates a conceptual wiretap channel
with input U, in which Bob observes the outputs Y and
U ⊕X while Eve observes the outputs Z and U ⊕X. From
Corollary 1, the secrecy capacity of this conceptual channel
for secrecy metrics Si with i ∈ J2, 6K is at least
sup
U
(
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Y,U ⊕X)
−p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Z,U ⊕X)
)
.
In particular, we can choose for U an i.i.d. process such that,
for all j ∈ N∗, Uj is independent of XYZ and uniformly
distributed in X . Then, with probability one,
I(U;Y,U⊕X) = log pU⊕X,Y|U(U⊕X,Y|U)
pU⊕X,Y(U⊕X,Y)
= log
pX|YU(X|YU) pY|U(Y|U)
pU⊕X|Y(U⊕X|Y) pY(Y)
= log pX|Y(X|Y)− log 1|X |n ,
where the last inequality follows from pY|U(Y|U) = pY(Y),
pX|YU(X|YU) = pX|Y(X|Y) since U is independent
of XY and pU⊕X|Y(U⊕X|Y) = 1|X |n by the crypto
lemma [9]. Therefore,
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Y,U ⊕X)
= log |X | − p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
H(X|Y). (18)
Similarly, one obtains
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Z,U ⊕X)
= log |X | − p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(X|Z). (19)
Combining (18) and (19), we conclude that any rate R such
that
R < p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(X|Z)− p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
H(X|Y)
is an achievable rate for the conceptual wiretap channel.
Since this channel allows one to transmit uniformly distributed
messages, R is also an achievable secret-key rate for the source
model. For i.i.d. discrete sources, a similar proof based on
Corollary 2 in place of Corollary 1 shows that the result
holds for metric S1 as well. The proof of the converse is an
information-spectrum version of the converse in [14] and is
omitted for brevity.
In Proposition 7, achievable key rates are expressed in terms
of conditional entropy; except in some special cases, such
as i.i.d. sources, this is rather different from the achievable
secrecy rates for wiretap channels in Corollary 1, which are
expressed in terms of mutual information. In particular, if
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(X) = p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
H(X), then,
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H(X|Z)− p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
H(X|Y)
> p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Y) − p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Z).
This distinction suggests that the coding mechanism for secret-
key distillation, which one would have to exploit to design
secret-key distillation strategies without relying on the exis-
tence of wiretap codes, is not linked to channel resolvability;
indeed, the first author has argued in a previous work that
secret-key distillation is more easily understood in terms of
channel intrinsic randomness [5], [24] and privacy amplifi-
cation [17], [37]. In that respect, the proof of Proposition 7
provides limited insight into the design of practical secret-key
distillation strategies.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed several models of secure communication
by building upon the work of Csisza´r [5] and Hayashi [6] and
by exploiting the idea that the coding mechanism to ensure
secrecy can be tied to channel resolvability. This approach
has allowed us to establish several results for generic chan-
nels and for stronger secrecy metrics than the usual average
mutual information rate between messages and eavesdropper’s
observations.
From a technical point of view, deriving secrecy from
channel resolvability provides a conceptually simple approach
to analyze the secure achievable rates of many models. Al-
though we have limited applications to mixed, compound, and
wireless channels, the connection between secrecy and channel
resolvability is useful in many other settings. Examples of
secure communication models for which deriving secrecy from
channel resolvability simplifies the analysis include queuing
channels [43], wireless channels with imperfect state informa-
tion [38], [39], runlength-limited channels [44], and two-way
wiretap channels [45].
From a practical perspective, we believe that the connec-
tion between strong secrecy and channel resolvability opens
BLOCH AND LANEMAN: STRONG SECRECY FROM CHANNEL RESOLVABILITY 15
intriguing perspectives for code design. In particular, we have
provided evidence that this connection circumvents a weakness
of capacity-based wiretap codes, which cannot always achieve
the strong secrecy capacity. This observation is consistent
with practical code constructions achieving strong secrecy
rates [33], [46] and other approaches based on privacy am-
plification [16], [29], [35].
Our results can be extended in several directions. For
instance, the coding mechanisms for secrecy presented in
Section IV for Shannon’s cipher system and in Section V for
wiretap channels can be combined without much difficulty
using a coding scheme similar to that proposed in [47].
One could also further investigate the nature of the coding
mechanisms for secrecy in secret-key agreement models. Some
results along these lines are already available, for instance
in [5], [24], [34].
APPENDIX A
SUPPORTING LEMMAS
Lemma 6 (Chernov bound). Let X be a real-valued random
variable with moment generating function φX : R → R :
s 7→ E[esX]. Let {Xi}ni=1 be i.i.d. with distribution pX . If the
integral defining φX converges uniformly in a neighborhood
of 0 and is differentiable at 0 then, ∀ǫ > 0 ∃αǫ > 0 such that
P
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi > E[X ] + ǫ
]
6 2−αǫn.
Lemma 7 (Basic properties of variational distance). Let X1,
X2, and X3 be random variables defined on the same alphabet
X . Then,
V(pX1 ; pX3) 6 V(pX1 ; pX2) + V(pX2 ; pX3),
and V(pX1 ; pX2) 6 V(pX1pX3 ; pX2X3)
= EX3
[
V
(
pX1 , pX2|X3
)]
.
Lemma 8 (Data-processing inequality for variational dis-
tance). Let X1 and X2 be random variables defined on the
same alphabet X . Let WZ|X be the transition probability from
X to Z and define the random variables Z1 and Z2 such that
∀(z, x) ∈ Z × X pZ1X1(z, x) = WZ|X(z|x)pX1(x)
and pZ2X2(z, x) = WZ|X(z|x)pX2(x).
Then, V(pZ1 , pZ2) 6 V(pX1 , pX2).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Let Cn be the random variable that denotes a randomly gen-
erated capacity-based wiretap code, whose codeword symbols
are generated i.i.d. according to the uniform distribution qX .
Let pZ be the output distribution of the eavesdropper’s channel
corresponding to the input on X , i.e.
∀z ∈ Z, pZ(z) =
∑
x∈X
WZ|X(z|x) 1|X | .
Let pZ be the distribution of n i.i.d. random variables dis-
tributed according to pZ . The proof of the proposition relies
on the following lemmas.
Lemma 9. Consider Mn , 2nR codewords of length n,
obtained by generating codeword symbols independently and
uniformly at random in X . If R < 12 log |X |, there exists
α0 > 0 such that the probability that all Mn codewords are
distinct satisfies
P[all Mn codewords are distinct] > 1− 2−α0n.
Proof: The proof follows from the same technique as
in [48, Lemma 6], which we recall for convenience. Note that,
P (all Mn codewords are distinct)
=
Mn−1∏
i=0
|X |n − i
|X |n =
Mn−1∏
i=0
(
1− i|X |n
)
Since ln(1 − x) > −x1−x for x ∈ [0, 1), we have
P (all Mn codewords are distinct)
> exp
(
−
Mn−1∑
i=0
i
|X |n − i
)
> exp
(
− (Mn − 1)(Mn − 1)|X |n − (Mn − 1)
)
.
Since e−x > 1− x, we obtain
P (all Mn codewords are distinct)
> 1− (Mn − 1)
2
|X |n − (Mn − 1) > 1−
M2n
|X |n −Mn
Substituting Mn = 2nR, we obtain
P (all Mn codewords are distinct) > 1− 2
2nR
|X |n − 2nR ,
which goes to 1 as n goes to infinity provided R < 12 log |X |.
Lemma 10. There exists α1 > 0, such that, for n sufficiently
large,
P[P∗e(Cn) 6 ǫ
′
n and S4(Cn) 6 3ǫ′n] > 1− 2−α1nǫ
2
n ,
with ǫ′n , max(ǫn, log |X | 2−α1nǫ
2
n , n−1).
Proof: The existence of α1 > 0 such that
P
[
P∗e(Cn) 6 2
−α1nǫ2n
]
> 1−2−α1nǫ2n follows from a standard
random coding argument. Consider a code Cn such that
P∗e(Cn) 6 2−α1nǫ
2
n
. Then, for n large enough,
S4(Cn) = 1n I
(
W1; Z¯
)
= 1
n
I
(
W1W
′; Z¯
)− 1
n
I
(
W ′; Z¯|W1
)
(a)
6 1
n
I
(
X¯; Z¯
)− 1
n
H(W ′|W1) + 1nH
(
W ′|W1Z¯
)
(b)
6 Ce − (Ce − ǫn) +R′P∗e(Cn) + 1n
6 3ǫ′n
where (a) follows because W1W ′ → X¯→ Z¯ forms a Markov
chain, and (b) follows from Fano’s inequality.
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Lemma 11. There exists β, α2 > 0, such that, for n large
enough
P
[
V(pZ¯, pZ) 6 2
−βn] > 1− 2−α2n.
Proof: This result follows from [10, Theorem 6.3.1]
by remarking that memoryless channels are exponentially
information stable or, alternatively, from [49, Lemma 19].
For n ∈ N∗, let Cn denote a randomly generated code such
that all codewords are distinct and
P
∗
e(Cn) 6 ǫ′n, S4(Cn) 6 3ǫ′n, and V(pZ¯, pZ) 6 2−βn. (20)
For n large enough, Lemma 9, Lemma 10, and Lemma 11
guarantee that this occurs with probability at least 1− 2−αnǫ2n
for some α < α1 and n large enough. With a slight abuse
of notation, we also let Cn ⊂ Xn denote the codebook and
let f−1n : Cn → M1 be the restriction to M1 of the inverse
mapping of fn, which is well defined since codewords are
distinct. Let us introduce the functions φn and ψn as
φn :Cn →M1 : x 7→ f−1n (x)
and ψn :Zn ×M1 → Cn : (z,m) 7→ fn(m,hn(z,m)).
The functions φn and ψn define the encoder and decoder of
a source code for the compression of the source X¯ ∈ Cn
(the choice of codewords uniformly at random in the code)
with Z¯ as correlated side information at the receiver, whose
probability of decoding error is P∗e(Cn). We now leverage the
results obtained by Hayashi [50] and generalized by Watan-
abe et al. [34] that establish a tradeoff between probability and
error and resolvability for source coding of arbitrary sources.
Combining [34, Theorem 10] and the proof of [34, Theorem
11], we obtain, ∀b > 0, ∀n ∈ N∗
P
∗
e(Cn) + S2(Cn) > 1−
(
2−b
√
n+1 + PX¯Z¯[An]
)
, (21)
with
An ,
{
(x, z) ∈ Cn ×Zn : 2
−b√n
|M1| < pX¯|Z¯(x|z) 6
2b
√
n
|M1|
}
.
Note that |M′| = 2n(Ce−ǫn) and pX¯
(
X¯
)
= 1|M1||M′| .
Therefore, by Bayes’s rule
PX¯Z¯[An] = PX¯Z¯
[
2−b
√
n
|M1| < pX¯|Z¯
(
X¯|Z¯) 6 2b
√
n
|M1|
]
= PX¯Z¯
[
2−b
√
n
|M1| < WZ|X(Z¯|X¯)
pX¯
(
X¯
)
pZ¯
(
Z¯
) 6 2b
√
n
|M1|
]
= PX¯Z¯
[Q+n ]− PX¯Z¯[Q−n ],
where we have defined
Q±n ,
{
(x, z) ∈ Cn ×Zn : log
WZ|X(z|x)
pZ¯(z)
6 ±b√n+ n(Ce − ǫn)
}
.
We analyze PX¯Z¯[Q+n ] and PX¯Z¯[Q−n ] by introducing the sets
A±n ,
{
(x, z) ∈ Cn ×Zn : log
WZ|X(z|x)
pZ(z)
6 ±2b√n+ n(Ce − ǫn)
}
Bn ,
{
(x, z) ∈ Cn ×Zn : log pZ¯(z)
pZ(z)
< b
√
n
}
and Dn ,
{
(x, z) ∈ Cn ×Zn : log pZ¯(z)
pZ(z)
> −b√n
}
.
Using the law of total probability and the fact that Q+n ∩
Bn ⊂ A+n , we now upper bound PX¯Z¯[Q+n ] as follows.
PX¯Z¯
[Q+n ] = PX¯Z¯[Q+n ∩ Bn]+ PX¯Z¯[Q+n ∩ Bcn]
6 PX¯Z¯
[A+n ]+ PX¯Z¯[Bcn]. (22)
We first establish a bound on PX¯Z¯[Bcn].
PX¯Z¯[Bcn] =
1
b
√
n
∑
z∈Zn
b
√
npZ¯(z)1
{
log
pZ¯(z)
pZ(z)
> b
√
n
}
6
1
b
√
n
∑
z∈Zn
pZ¯(z) log
pZ¯(z)
pZ(z)
=
1
b
√
n
D(pZ¯‖pZ). (23)
We define µZ , minz∈Z:pZ(z)>0 pZ(z) and we upper bound
the divergence as follows.
D(pZ¯‖pZ) = −H
(
Z¯
)
+
∑
z∈Zn
pZ¯(z) log
1
pZ(z)
= H(Z)−H(Z¯)+ ∑
z∈Zn
(pZ¯(z)− pZ(z)) log
1
pZ(z)
6
∣∣H(Z)−H(Z¯)∣∣+ nV(pZ¯, pZ) log 1µZ
(a)
6 V(pZ¯, pZ) log
|Z|n
V(pZ¯, pZ)
+ nV(pZ¯, pZ) log
1
µZ
(b)
6
(
log |Z|+ β + log 1
µZ
)
n2−βn (24)
where (a) follows from [36, Lemma 2.7] and (b) follows from
the fact that x 7→ x log |Z|n
x
is monotonously increasing for x
small enough.
To upper bound PX¯Z¯[A+n ], recall that the eavesdrop-
per’s channel is symmetric; hence, there exists a partition
{Zi}i∈J1,kK of Z such that:
1) ∀x, x˜ ∈ X , there exists a permutation πxx˜ : Z → Z that
satisfies
∀i ∈ J1, kK πxx˜(Zi) = Zi
∀z ∈ Z WZ|X(z|x) = WZ|X(πxx˜(z)|x˜)
2) The output distribution pZ correponding to a uniform
input distribution is locally uniform, i.e.
∀i ∈ J1, kK , ∀z, z′ ∈ Zi pZ(z) = pZ(z′).
Consequently, upon defining bn , 2b
√
n + n(Ce − ǫn) and
for any x˜ ∈ X , we can rewrite PX¯Z¯[A+n ] as shown on top of
the next page, where (a) follows because the eavesdropper’s
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PX¯Z¯
[A+n ] = ∑
x∈Cn
1
|Cn|
∑
z∈Zn
WZ|X(z|x)1
{
log
WZ|X(z|x)
pZ(z)
6 bn
}
=
∑
x∈Cn
1
|Cn|
∑
z∈Zn
(
n∏
i=1
WZ|X(zi|xi)
)
1
{
n∑
i=1
log
WZ|X(zi|xi)
pZ(zi)
6 bn
}
(a)
=
∑
x∈Cn
1
|Cn|
∑
z∈Zn
(
n∏
i=1
WZ|X(πxix˜(zi)|x˜)
)
1
{
n∑
i=1
log
WZ|X(πxix˜(zi)|x˜)
pZ(πxix˜(zi))
6 bn
}
(b)
=
∑
x∈Cn
1
|Cn|
∑
z∈Zn
(
n∏
i=1
WZ|X(zi|x˜)
)
1
{
n∑
i=1
log
WZ|X(zi|x˜)
pZ(zi)
6 bn
}
(c)
= P
[
n∑
i=1
log
WZ|X(Z˜i|x˜)
pZ(Z˜i)
6 bn
]
channel is symmetric, (b) follows because the functions πxix˜
are permutations, and (c) follows by defining the i.i.d. random
variables Z˜i as the eavesdropper’s channel output when the
channel input is the symbol x˜. Note that the random variables
log
WZ|X (Z˜i|x˜)
pZ(Z˜i)
are also i.i.d., with mean Ce since the channel
is symmetric, variance σ > 0, and third moment ρ < ∞;
therefore,
PX¯Z¯
[A+n ] = P
[
1√
nσ
n∑
i=1
(
log
WZ|X(Z˜i|x˜)
pZ(Z˜i)
− Ce
)
6
2b
σ
−
√
nǫn
σ
]
.
From the Berry-Esseen Theorem [51], there exists a universal
constant c > 0 such that
PX¯Z¯
[A+n ] 6 1√
2π
∫ 2b
σ
−
√
nǫn
σ
−∞
e−
x2
2 dx+ c√
n
ρ
σ3
. (25)
Similarly, using the law of total probability, the fact that
A−n ∩ Dn ⊂ Q−n ∩ Dn, and the inclusion-exclusion principle,
we lower bound PX¯Z¯[Q−n ] as follows.
PX¯Z¯
[Q−n ] = PX¯Z¯[Q−n ∩ Dn]+ PX¯Z¯[Q−n ∩ Dcn]
> PX¯Z¯
[A−n ∩ Dn]
= PX¯Z¯
[A−n ]+ PX¯Z¯[Dn]− PX¯Z¯[A−n ∪ Dn]
> PX¯Z¯
[A−n ]+ PX¯Z¯[Dn]− 1
> PX¯Z¯
[A−n ]− PX¯Z¯[Dcn] (26)
Note that,
PX¯Z¯[Dcn] =
∑
z∈Zn
pZ¯(z)1
{
log
pZ¯(z)
pZ(z)
6 −b√n
}
6 2−b
√
n
∑
z∈Zn
pZ(z)
6 2−b
√
n. (27)
and, following the reasoning leading to (25),
PX¯Z¯
[A−n ] > 1√
2π
∫ − 2b
σ
−
√
nǫn
σ
−∞
e−
x2
2 dx− c√
n
ρ
σ3
. (28)
Combining equations (22)-(28), we obtain
PX¯Z¯[An] = PX¯Z¯
[Q+n ]− PX¯Z¯[Q−n ]
6
1√
2π
∫ 2b
σ
−
√
nǫn
σ
− 2b
σ
−
√
nǫn
σ
e−
x2
2 dx+ 2c√
n
ρ
σ3
+
√
n
b
(
log |Z|+ β + log 1
µZ
)
2−βn + 2−b
√
n
6
4b
σ
√
2π
+
2c√
n
ρ
σ3
+
√
n
b
(
log |Z|+ β + log 1
µZ
)
2−βn + 2−b
√
n.
(29)
Combining (29) with (21), and using the assumption
limn→∞ P∗e(Cn) = 0 from (20), we have
∀b > 0 lim
n→∞
S2(Cn) > 1− 4b
σ
√
2π
.
Therefore, there exists η > 0 such that, for n large enough,
S2(Cn) > η. Notice that Proposition 1 immediately implies
that there exists η∗ > 0 such that limn→∞ S1(Cn) > η∗.
APPENDIX C
LEMMAS USED IN THE ACHIEVABILITY PROOF OF
THEOREM 2
The following notation is used throughout this appendix. We
recall that U,X,Y,Z are the random variables defined by the
random code generation with distribution given in (6). For any
(k, l,m) ∈ J1,M0K× J1,M1K× J1,M ′K, the random variables
representing the codewords uk and xklm obtained with the
random code generation are denoted by Uk and Xklm.
The random variables that correspond to the use of a specific
code Cn are denoted by U¯, X¯, Y¯, Z¯ with distribution given
by (4). The channel outputs that correspond to the transmission
of uk and xklm are denoted by Y¯klm, and Z¯klm, respectively.
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A. Proof of Lemma 1
By symmetry of the random code construction, we have
E[Pe(Cn)]
=
M0∑
k=1
M1∑
l=1
M ′∑
m=1
E[Pe(Cn|W0 = k,W1 = l,W ′ = m)]
M0M1M ′
= E[Pe(Cn|W0 = 1,W1 = 1,W ′ = 1)],
which can be analyzed in terms of the events
E1(k) ,
{
(U¯k, Y¯111) ∈ T n1 |W0 = W1 = W ′ = 1
}
E2(k) ,
{
(U¯k, Z¯111) ∈ T n3 |W0 = W1 = W ′ = 1
}
E3(k, l,m)
,
{
(U¯k, X¯klm, Y¯111) ∈ T n2 |W0 = W1 = W ′ = 1
}
.
It follows from standard arguments (see, for instance, [10,
Chapter 3]) that E[Pe(Cn)] < ǫ for n large enough provided
1
n
logM0 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Y) − 2γ
1
n
logM0 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Z) − 2γ
1
n
logM1M
′ 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Y|U) − 2γ.
(30)
B. Proof of Lemma 2
We start by developing an upper bound for S2(Cn) that will
be simpler to analyze. First, we have
S2(Cn) , V
(
pW1Z¯, pW1pZ¯
)
6 V
(
pU¯W1Z¯, pW1pU¯Z¯
)
= EU¯W1
[
V
(
pZ¯|U¯W1 , pZ¯|U¯
)]
.
Next, we use Lemma 7 to further bound S2(Cn) as follows.
S2(Cn) 6 EU¯W1
[
V
(
pZ¯|U¯W1 , pZ|U
)
+ V
(
pZ|U, pZ¯|U¯
)]
= EU¯W1
[
V
(
pZ¯|U¯W1 , pZ|U
)]
+ EU¯
[
V
(
pZ|U, pZ¯|U¯
)]
6 EU¯W1
[
V
(
pZ¯|U¯W1 , pZ|U
)]
+ EU¯
[
V
(
pW1pZ|U, pZ¯W1|U¯
)]
= 2EU¯W1
[
V
(
pZ¯|U¯W1 , pZ|U
)]
. (31)
Notice that the term in brackets on the right hand side is a
variational distance between the following two distributions:
• pZ¯|U¯=uk,W1=l(z) =
∑M ′
m=1
1
M ′WZ|X(z|xklm), which
represents the distribution induced at the eavesdropper’s
channel output by the M ′ codewords {xkli}i∈J1,M ′K
selected with a uniform distribution;
• pZ|U=uk(z) =
∑
x
WZ|X(z|x)pX|U=uk(x), which rep-
resents the distribution induced at the eavesdropper’s
channel output by an input process with distribution
pX|U=uk(x).
Therefore, a sufficient condition for S2(Cn) to vanish is that,
for every pair (k, l) ∈ J1,M0K × J1,M1K, the variational
distance between the two distributions vanishes as well. This
is possible if each set of codewords {xkli}i∈J1,M ′K approxi-
mates the same process with distribution pZ|U=uk(z) at the
eavesdropper’s output, which is exactly what the concept of
channel resolvability reviewed in Section II is about. In other
words, a sufficient condition to guarantee secrecy is for each
sub-codebook {xkli}i∈J1,M ′K to be a “channel resolvability
code”.
We establish the existence of such codebooks with a random
coding argument following that used in [7], [10]. The presence
of a common message makes the proof slightly more involved
but the steps remain essentially the same. On taking the
average over Cn for both sides of (31), we obtain
ECn [S2(Cn)] 6 2EU¯W1
[
ECn
[
V
(
pZ¯|U¯W1 , pZ|U
)]] (32)
By symmetry of the random code construction, the inner
expectation in (32) is the same for all values of U¯ = uk
and W1 = l; hence, we have
ECn [S2(Cn)] 6 2ECn
[
V
(
pZ¯|U¯=U1W1=1, pZ|U=U1
)]
. (33)
Let τ > 0. On using [10, Lemma 6.3.1] we finally upper
bound (33) as
ECn [S2(Cn)] 6 4
τ
log e
+ 4An (34)
with
An , ECn
[
PZ¯|U¯=U1W1=1
[
log
pZ¯|U¯=U1W1=1
(
Z¯
)
pZ|U=U1(Z¯)
> τ
]]
.
Note that the expectation over Cn reduces to the expectation
overU1 and {X11j}j∈J1,M ′K. Writing An explicitly, we obtain
Equation (35) shown on top of the next page, where equality
(a) follows from the definition of pZ¯|U¯=u1W1=1,Cn(z), equal-
ity (b) follows by remarking that all codewords are generated
according to the same density pX|U and equality (c) follows
by noting that
• WZ|X(z|x111)pX|U(x111|u1) = pZX|U(z,x111|u1) ac-
cording to (6);
• for any u1 such that pX|U(x11m|u1) > 0,
pZ¯|U¯=u1W1=1(z) =
1
M ′
M ′∑
m=1
WZ|X(z|x11m)
=
1
M ′
M ′∑
m=1
pZ|XU(z|x11mu1).
By adapting the proof technique developed in [10, Chapter
6] and after some calculations, one can further bound An to
obtain
ECn [S2(Cn)] 6 4
τ
log e
+ 4PUXZ
[
1
n
I(X;Z|U) > logM
′
n
+
log ρ
n
]
+ 4PUXZ
[
1
n
I(X;Z|U) > logM
′
n
]
+
4 · 2−nγ
ρ2
+
4
ρ2
PUXZ
[
1
n
I(X;Z|U) > logM
′
n
− γ
]
. (36)
where ρ , 2
τ−1
2 . Therefore, ECn [S2(Cn)] < ǫ for n large
enough provided
1
n
logM ′ > p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Z|U) + 2γ. (37)
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An =
∑
u1∈Un
pU(u1)
∑
x111∈Xn
pX|U(x111|u1) · · ·
∑
x
11M′∈Xn
pX|U(x11M ′ |u1)
∑
z∈Zn
pZ¯|U¯=u1W1=1(z)1
{
log
pZ¯|U¯=u1W1=1(z)
pZ|U(z|u1) > τ
}
(a)
=
1
M ′
M ′∑
m=1
∑
u1∈Un
pU(u1)
∑
x111∈Xn
pX|U(x111|u1) · · ·
∑
x
11M′∈Xn
pX|U(x11M ′ |u1)
∑
z∈Zn
WZ|X(z|x11m)1
{
log
pZ¯|U¯=u1W1=1(z)
pZ|U(z|u1) > τ
}
(b)
=
∑
u1∈Un
pU(u1)
∑
x112∈Xn
pX|U(x112|u1) · · ·
∑
x
11M′∈Xn
pX|U(x11M ′ |u1)
∑
x111∈Xn
∑
z∈Zn
WZ|X(z|x111)pX|U(x111|u1)1
{
log
pZ¯|U¯=u1W1=1(z)
pZ|U(z|u1) > τ
}
,
(c)
=
∑
u1∈Un
pU(u1)
∑
x112∈Xn
pX|U(x112|u1) · · ·
∑
x
11M′∈Xn
pX|U(x11M ′ |u1)
∑
x111∈Xn
∑
z∈Zn
pZX|U(z,x111|u1)1

log

 1
M ′
M ′∑
m=1
pZ|XU(z|x11mu1)
pZ|U(z|u1)

 > τ

 (35)
APPENDIX D
LEMMA USED IN THE CONVERSE PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove Lemma 3, note that, with probability one,
1
n
I
(
W¯; Z¯
)
= 1
n
I
(
W¯; Z¯U¯
)− 1
n
I
(
W¯; U¯|Z¯)
= 1
n
I
(
W¯; Z¯|U¯)− 1
n
I
(
W¯; U¯|Z¯)
= 1
n
I
(
W¯; Z¯|U¯)− 1
n
H
(
U¯|Z¯)+ 1
n
H
(
U¯|W¯Z¯) ,
where the second equality follows from the independence of
W¯ and U¯. Consequently,
lim
n→∞
S6(Cn) = p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W¯; Z¯
)
> p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W¯; Z¯|U¯)− p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
H
(
U¯|Z¯)
+ p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H
(
U¯|W¯Z¯).
Since limn→∞ Pe(Cn) = 0, note that
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H
(
U¯|W¯Z¯) = 0 and p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H
(
U¯|Z¯) = 0
by the Verdu´-Han Lemma. As limn→∞ S6(Cn) = 0, we
finally obtain
p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W¯; Z¯|U¯) = 0.
Note that, with probability one,
H
(
W¯
)
= H
(
W¯
)−H(W¯|Y¯U¯)+H(W¯|Y¯U¯)
= I
(
W¯; Y¯|U¯)− I(W¯; Z¯|U¯)+ I(W¯; Z¯|U¯)
+H
(
W¯|Y¯U¯)
Hence,
R1 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H
(
W¯
)
6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W¯; Y¯|U¯)− p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W¯; Z¯|U¯)
+ p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W¯; Z¯|U¯)+ p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
H
(
W¯|YU¯)
As seen above, p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W¯; Z¯|U¯) = 0 and, since
limn→∞ Pe(Cn) = 0, we have p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
H
(
W¯|Y¯U¯) = 0.
Therefore,
R1 6 p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W; Y¯|U¯)− p-limsup
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W; Z¯|U¯).
Finally, with probability one,
H
(
U¯
)
= I
(
U¯; Y¯
)
+H
(
Y¯|U¯) = I(U¯; Z¯)+H(Z¯|U¯)
from which conclude after a similar reasoning that
R0 6 min
(
p-liminf
n→∞
I
(
U¯; Y¯
)
, p-liminf
n→∞
I
(
U¯; Z¯
))
.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We prove Theorem 3 with small modifications of the proof
of Theorem 2. Specifically, we establish secrecy for S1 by
showing that there exist sequences of codes {Cn}n>1 for
which S2(Cn) decreases exponentially fast with n and by
using [5, Lemma 1] to obtain an upper bound for S1(Cn).
We handle the power constraint by using an appropriate
distribution during the random code generation process as
in [10, Section 3.2]. We note that a similar technique has been
used by He and Yener in [52].
20 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, TO APPEAR
Let γ, δ, ǫ > 0. Let U be an arbitrary discrete alphabet and
fix a distribution pU˜ on U . Fix a conditional distribution pX˜|U˜
on X × U such that E
[
c(X˜)
]
6 P − δ. Let U˜, X˜, Z˜ be the
random variables with joint distribution
p
Z˜X˜U˜
(z,x,u) =
n∏
i=1
WZ|X(zi|xi)pX˜|U˜ (xi|ui)pU˜ (ui).
We assume that U˜, X˜, Z˜ are such that the integrals defining the
moment generating functions of c(X˜) and I
(
X˜; Z˜|U˜
)
con-
verge uniformly in a neighborhood of 0 and are differentiable
at 0.
Define the set Pn as
Pn ,
{
x ∈ Xn : 1
n
n∑
i=1
c(xi) 6 P
}
.
Lemma 6 shows that there exists αδ > 0 such that
P
[
X˜ ∈ Pn
]
> 1 − 2−αδn. In the sequel, we define γn ,
1− 2−nαδ2 . Define the set Gn ⊂ Un as follows:
Gn ,
{
u : P
X˜|U˜=u
[
X˜ /∈ Pn|U˜ = u
]
< 2−n
αδ
2
}
.
Upon using Markov’s inequality, we obtain
P
U˜
[
U˜ /∈ Gn
]
= P
U˜
[
P
X˜|U˜
[
X˜ /∈ Pn|U˜
]
> 2−n
αδ
2
]
6 E
U˜
[
P
X˜|U˜
[
X˜ /∈ Pn|U˜
]]
2n
αδ
2
= P
X˜
[
X˜ /∈ Pn
]
2n
αδ
2
6 2−n(αδ−
αδ
2 )
= 1− γn. (38)
Now, we define the random variables U,X,Z as follows.
First,
∀u ∈ Un pU(u) =
{
1
P
U˜[U˜∈Gn]
p
U˜
(u) if u ∈ Gn
0 else.
From Eq. (38), we have
∀u ∈ Un pU(u) 6 pU˜(u)
γn
. (39)
Next, ∀(x,u) ∈ Xn × Gn
pX|U(x|u) =
{
1
P
X˜|U˜=u[X˜∈Pn|U˜=u]
p
X˜|U˜(x|u) if x ∈ Pn
0 else.
By construction, we have
∀(x,u) ∈ Xn × Gn pX|U(x|u) 6
p
X˜|U˜(x|u)
γn
. (40)
Finally, ∀(z,x,u) ∈ Zn ×Xn × Gn
pZXU(z,x,u) = WZ|X(z|x)pX|U(x|u) pU(u) . (41)
We repeat the random coding argument in the proof of
Theorem 2 using the distribution pXU defined by (41) and
with the following lemmas.
Lemma 12 (Reliability conditions).
If R0 6 min
(
I
(
U˜ ; Y˜
)
− 2γ, I
(
U˜ ; Z˜
)
− 2γ
)
and R1 +R′1 6 I
(
X˜ ; Y˜ |U˜
)
− 2γ,
then limn→∞ E[Pe(Cn)] 6 ǫ.
Proof: Following [10, Proof of Theorem 3.6.2], one can
show that
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Y) > I
(
U˜ ; Y˜
)
,
p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(U;Z) > I
(
U˜ ; Z˜
)
and p-liminf
n→∞
1
n
I(X;Y|U) > I
(
X˜; Y˜ |U˜
)
.
Hence, the result follows directly from Lemma 1.
Lemma 13 (Secrecy from channel resolvability conditions).
There exists αδ,γ > 0, such that
If R′1 > I
(
X˜; Z˜|U˜
)
+ 2γ then lim
n→∞E[S2(Cn)] 6 2
−αδ,γ .
Proof: Note that (31) still holds. Upon using Lemma 7,
we obtain
ECn [S2(Cn)] 6 2ECn
[
V
(
pZ¯|U¯=U1,W1=1,Cn , pZ|U=U1
)]
6 2ECn
[
V
(
pZ¯|U¯=U1,W1=1,Cn , pZ˜|U˜=U1
)]
+ 2ECn
[
V
(
p
Z˜|U˜=U1 , pZ|U=U1
)]
. (42)
First, we bound the second term on the right-hand side
of (42). For all u1 ∈ Gn, we obtain the bound shown in
Equation (43) on the next page, where (a) follows from
Lemma 8, (b) follows because PX|U=u1 [B ∩ Pcn] = 0 by
Eq. (41), and (c) follows from the bound in Eq. (40); therefore,
for n large enough, there exists βδ > 0, such that
ECn
[
V
(
p
Z˜|U˜=U1 , pZ|U=U1
)]
6 2−βδn (44)
We now bound the first term on the right-hand side of (42).
Applying [10, Lemma 6.3.1], we obtain
2ECn
[
V
(
pZ¯|U¯=U1W1=1, pZ˜|U˜=U1
)]
6 4
τ
log e
+ 4ECn
[
PZ¯|U¯=U1W1=1
[
log
pZ¯|U¯=U1W1=1
(
Z¯
)
p
Z˜|U˜=U1(Z¯)
> τ
]]
.
(45)
Note that (45) is similar to (34), and the only difference is the
presence of p
Z˜|U˜ instead of pZ|U in the denominator; using
the definition of pZXU in (41), the bounds in (39) and (40),
and repeating the steps leading from (34) to (36), one obtains
BLOCH AND LANEMAN: STRONG SECRECY FROM CHANNEL RESOLVABILITY 21
V
(
p
Z˜|U˜=u1 , pZ|U=u1
) (a)
6 V
(
p
X˜|U˜=u1 , pX|U=u1
)
= 2 sup
A⊆Xn
∣∣∣PX|U=u1 [A]− PX˜|U˜=u1 [A]
∣∣∣
6 sup
A⊆Xn
∑
B∈{A,Ac}
(∣∣∣PX|U=u1 [B]− PX˜|U˜=u1 [B]
∣∣∣)
(b)
6 sup
A⊆Xn
∑
B∈{A,Ac}
(∣∣∣PX|U=u1 [B ∩ Pn]− PX˜|U˜=u1 [B ∩ Pcn]− PX˜|U˜=u1 [B ∩ Pn]
∣∣∣)
(c)
6 sup
A⊆Xn
∑
B∈{A,Ac}
(
P
X˜|U˜=u1 [B ∩ Pn]
(
1
γn
− 1
)
+ P
X˜|U˜=u1 [B ∩ Pcn]
)
6 (
1
γn
− 1) + (1 − γn), (43)
after some calculations
2ECn
[
V
(
pZ¯|U¯=U1W1=1, pZ˜n
1
|U˜=U1
)]
6 4
τ
log e
+
4
γ2n
P
U˜X˜Z˜
[
1
n
I
(
X˜; Z˜|U˜
)
>
logM ′
n
+
log ρ
n
]
+
4
γ3n
P
U˜X˜Z˜
[
1
n
I
(
X˜; Z˜|U˜
)
>
logM ′
n
]
+
4 · 2−nγ
γn(γnρ+ γn − 1)2
+
4
γn(γnρ+ γn − 1)2PU˜X˜Z˜
[
1
n
I
(
X˜; Z˜|U˜
)
>
logM ′
n
− γ
]
.
(46)
If 1
n
logM ′ > I
(
X˜ ; Z˜|U˜
)
+ 2γ, then Lemma 6 guarantees
there exists αγ > 0 such that
P
U˜X˜Z˜
[
1
n
I
(
X˜; Z˜|U˜
)
>
logM ′
n
− γ
]
6 2−αγn. (47)
Set τ = 2−ηn for some η such that 0 < 2η < min(γ, αγ); note
that ρ = ln 22 2
−ηn + o(2−ηn). Therefore, for n large enough,
1
n
log ρ > −γ, 1
γn(γnρ+ γn − 1) 6 2 · 2
ηn,
1
γ3n
6 2.
(48)
Consequently, combining (42), (44), (46), (47) and (48), we
obtain for n large enough,
ECn [S2(Cn)] 6 4 ·
2−ηn
log e
+ 8 · 2−αγn + 8 · 2−αγn
+ 16 · 2−(γ−2η)n + 16 · 2−(αγ−2η)n + 2 · 2−βδn.
Therefore, for n large enough, there exists αγ,δ > 0 such that
E[S2(Cn)] 6 2
−αγ,δn
.
Using Markov’s inequality and for n sufficiently large, we
conclude that if
R0 6 min
(
I
(
U˜ ; Y˜
)
− 2γ, I
(
U˜ ; Z˜
)
− 2γ
)
R1 6 I
(
X˜; Y˜ |U˜
)
− I
(
X˜; Z˜|U˜
)
− 4γ,
then there exists a specific code Cn such that Pe(Cn) 6 2ǫ and
S2(Cn) 6 2−
αγ,δ
2
n
. Using [5, Lemma 1] with n large enough,
we obtain S1(Cn) 6 2−βγ,δn for some βγ,δ > 0.
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